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ABSTRACT 
 
The question addressed by this dissertation is how the human brain builds a coherent representation 
of the body, and how this representation is used to recognize its own body. Recent approaches by 
neuroimaging and TMS revealed hints for a distinct brain representation of human body, as 
compared with other stimulus categories. Neuropsychological studies demonstrated that body-parts 
and self body-parts recognition are separate processes sub-served by two different, even if possibly 
overlapping, networks within the brain.  
Bodily self-recognition is one aspect of our ability to distinguish between self and others and the 
self/other distinction is a crucial aspect of social behaviour. This is the reason why I have conducted 
a series of experiment on subjects with everyday difficulties in social and emotional behaviour, 
such as patients with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD). 
More specifically, I studied the implicit self body/face recognition (Chapter 6) and the influence of 
emotional body postures on bodily self-processing in TD children as well as in ASD children 
(Chapter 7). I found that the bodily self-recognition is present in TD and in ASD children and that 
emotional body postures modulate self and others’ body processing. 
Subsequently, I compared implicit and explicit bodily self-recognition in a neuro-degenerative 
pathology, such as in PD patients, and I found a selective deficit in implicit but not in explicit self-
recognition (Chapter 8). This  finding suggests that implicit and explicit bodily self-recognition are 
separate processes subtended by different mechanisms that can be selectively impaired.  
If the bodily self is crucial for self/other distinction, the space around the body (personal space) 
represents the space of interaction and communication with others. When, I studied this space in 
autism, I found that personal space regulation is impaired in ASD children (Chapter 9). 
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OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the distinction between self and others and the 
interpersonal regulation of own personal space.  
A sense of identity is necessary in order to successfully interact with others people. The sense of 
identity is based on different cognitive abilities, such as self-recognition of own body and the 
interpersonal regulation of our behaviors. Features of these two aspects of the self have been 
reviewed in Chapter 1. 
Studies using different methods (behavioral, fMRI, TMS studies) have shown that the recognition 
of one’s own body is independent from the recognition of other people’s bodies. Recent evidence 
suggests that a specific neural network is dedicated to “self-body” recognition. This brain network 
seems to be, at least partially, distinct from that responsible for general body-related information 
processing. A similar distinction was also found for face and “self-face” recognition. In Chapter 2 
and 3 the literature about the cognitive mechanism of the recognition of our own body and face and 
their underpinning cerebral networks were revised. How the brain built the presentation of self-body 
and the development of the healthy and pathological bodily self-recognition was revised in Chapter 
4.  
When we interact with others people we have to be aware not only of own body but also of the 
others’ bodies. During interaction we automatically regulate our posture and our position in the 
space in respect of those of other. For this reason in Chapter 5 the literature about the regulation of 
own personal space was revised. 
In Chapter 6 and 8 the development and the degeneration of the bodily during the life span were 
investigated. In particular, in Chapter 6 the development of implicit bodily self-recognition was 
studied in children wit typical development and in children with a deficit in distinguishing self from 
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others, such as children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). In Chapter 8,  the deterioration of 
the bodily self-recognition was studied in patients with a deficit of body-awareness, such as patients 
with Parkinson’s disease. In these two Chapters a matching-to sample task was adopted to evaluate 
the implicit ability to recognize own body. Moreover, in patients with Parkinson’s disease the 
implicit self-body recognition was compared with the explicit self body recognition.  
In Chapter 7 a variation of the same matching-to sample task was used to study if other 
informations can favor the self/other distinction. Specifically in this chapter the influence of 
emotional body postures on implicit bodily self-processing was studied in healthy and in autistic 
children. Finally in Chapter 9 we investigated how we regulated our personal space during social 
experience. Particularly, we studied whether the personal space is differently regulated by the 
presence of an unknown individual and by a brief social interactions with other people in healthy 
and autistic children.  
Part of the studies described in this thesis are published in:  
Gessaroli, E., Santelli, E., diPellgrino, G. and Frassinetti, F. (2013) Personal space regulation in 
childhood autism spectrum disorders.  Plos one, 8:e74959. 
Gessaroli, E., Andreani, V., Pellegri, E. and Frassinetti, F. (2013) Self-face and self-body 
recognition in autism. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 7: 793–800. 
Zamagni, E., Dolcini, C.,  Gessaroli, E., Santelli, E. and Frassinetti, F. (2011) Scared by you: 
modulation of bodily-self by emotional body-postures in autism. Neuropsychology, 25:270-6. 
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CHAPTER 1.  SELF-KNOWLEDGE  
 
Neisser (1991) proposes that from the outset infants develop two kinds of implicit self-knowledge: 
knowledge about the self in relation to others (the interpersonal self) and knowledge about the self 
in relation to physical objects (the ecological self). Following Neisser, perceiving and acting in the 
social or physical realm correspond to two basic kinds of implicit self-knowledge developing from 
birth. The interpersonal self grows out of the infant’s transactions with others, in particular the 
developing sense of shared experience and reciprocity. In the physical domain, infants develop a 
sense of their own body in relation to other objects (the ecological self). The ecological self is the 
sense infants develop of their own physical body as a differentiated and situated agent in the 
environment. The ecological self develops as infants interact with physical objects and also as they 
perceive their own body directly via self-exploration (Amsterdam, 1972; Rochat & Morgan, 1995; 
Rochat, 1998).   
Thus for humans, it is really important to firstly develop a sense of self and then use this self-
awareness to interact with others. For this reason in this thesis aspects of both the interpersonal and 
ecological self will be explored. First the cognitive processes and underlying brain networks of the 
ecological self will be explored, specifically in reference to the self-recognition of one’s own body. 
Second we explore how we regulate the distance between our body and the other’s body during 
interpersonal relationships. 
 
1.1.The ecological self  
Distinguishing the self from others is necessary for self-awareness and social interaction. This 
distinction is thought to depend on multisensory integration. Indeed, we recognize ourselves 
because the brain processes some visual, auditory or somatosensory stimuli as “me”. All these 
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inputs participate in the recognition of different aspects of one's physical self, such as one's face, 
voice, body or its movement. 
For example Rosa and coworkers (2008) showed that adults rarely mistake their own recorded voice 
for someone else’s voice. Even though people recognize that the recorded voice sounds different 
from the voice as we normally hear it, people most often still recognize the recording as their own 
voice. 
Another example of self-recognition was given by Loula and coworkers (2005).  They asked 
participants to perform a self-identification task while observing sagittal displays of point-light 
depictions of themselves, their friends, and strangers while performing various actions. The 
researchers found higher sensitivity to one’s own motion. The researchers conclude that since 
everyone has little experience of viewing their own body moving, such self-advantage can be 
explained by the activation of observers’ own action motor representation.  
In the same vein, Tsakiris and coworkers (2006) carried out a study in which participants had to 
decide whether in a projected image they viewed their own right hand or someone else’s right hand 
covered with identical gloves. Participants experienced a passive displacement of their own right 
index finger, either generated by the experimenter or by participants’ own left hand. The results 
showed that the performance was significantly better when the displacement of the participants’ 
right index finger was self-generated. As argued by Tsakiris and coworkers (2007) this shows that 
‘‘Self recognition was significantly more accurate when subjects themselves were the authors of the 
action’’.   
We recognize ourselves also thanks to our physical appearance.   
One of the first researchers to study the ability to recognize one's own physical features was Gallup. 
Gallup (1970) conducted an experimental test using a relatively simple approach. Individually 
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housed chimpanzees were confronted with a full-length mirror outside their cages for a period of 10 
days. The chimpanzees initially reacted as if they were seeing another chimpanzee and engaged in a 
variety of social displays directed toward the reflection. These social responses waned after the first 
few days. Rather than continue to respond to the mirror as such, the chimpanzees began using the 
mirror to respond to themselves by engaging in mirror-mediated facial and bodily movements and 
self-directed responses such as grooming parts of the body only visible in the mirror. The transition 
from social to self-oriented responding gave the impression that the chimpanzees had learned to 
recognize themselves. To assess this possibility Gallup devised the mark test. Each chimpanzee was 
anesthetized and, while unconscious, a red mark was applied to the brow above one eye and the top 
half of the opposite ear. A non-odorous, non-irritant dye was used, so that upon recovery from the 
anesthetic the chimpanzees would have no knowledge of the marks. Observations in the absence of 
the mirror confirmed this as the chimpanzees rarely touched the marks. When the mirror was 
reinstated, however, the effect was dramatic: the chimpanzees looked at their reflection and guided 
their fingers to the marks on their faces that could only be seen in the mirror. In addition to touching 
the marks repeatedly and looking at their fingers, some even smelled their fingers.  
Such abilities to recognize one's own physical features are purportedly possessed by only a small 
selection of primate species, including humans (Reiss and Marino, 2001 and Suarez and Gallup, 
1981), and they are considered as behavioral markers of self-awareness. 
A large number of studies report that infants recognize themselves in the mirror at 14–18 months 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004).  However, recent research has shown that 
infants develop self-other discrimination in specular images long before this age (Rochat & Striano, 
2002).  
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The mirror self-recognition is only one particular self-recognition behavior. We normally also 
recognize our body when seeing videos or photos. In the following chapters we analyze studies that 
used videos or photos to understand the cognitive mechanisms of self-recognition. 
The ability to recognize that the other is distinct from the self is considered an early marker of 
typical development, and it is central to the ability to form social bonds and engage in successful 
social interactions (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Rochat and Striano, 2000; Keenan et al., 2003). 
Conversely, a diminished ability to discriminate whether stimuli are related to the self or to others is 
associated with deficits in interpersonal interactions, often seen in various psychopathologies. For 
instance, individuals with schizophrenia exhibit both social deficits and impairment in self- 
recognition processes (Irani et al., 2006). Patients with autism or Parkinson disease also exhibit both 
social deficits and impairment in self- recognition processes (Messer et al., 2000; Uddin et al., 
2008; Gamarra et al., 2009). For this reason in this thesis we analyze the self-other differentiation 
processes as the first step to developing social ability as the regulation of the space between two 
interacting people. 
 
1.2 The interpersonal self 
When a person notices that he or she is being looked at, or is being approached by another person, 
he/she becomes aware that the attention or intentionality of another person is directed at him/her. 
This awareness is a basic mindset during social interaction. This aspect of self is obviously distinct 
from the physical self because it inherently requires the existence of another person. This category 
of self could be labelled “interpersonal self”. 
The interpersonal self has a lot of aspects: for example the comparison of the actual self with the 
socially-presented/perceived self, the adaptation of our behavior to social roles or the evolutionary 
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development of the personality in affective relationships. In this thesis we analyze a specific aspect 
of the interpersonal self: the personal distance that people prefer to maintain during interpersonal 
meetings. In a specific chapter we will analyze the interpersonal regulation of own personal space. 
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CHAPTER 2.  SELF FACE RECOGNITION IN ADULTS 
 
To remember and recognize our face is essential for social interaction. Indeed we sometimes have 
anxiety or thoughts about the appearance of our face. We can think that our image could be helpful 
or not for our aims. To be aware of our own characteristics could be helpful in evaluating for 
example, the reaction that other people have in respect to our image.  
The ability to recognize our face develops quite early but can be lost after brain injury or other 
cerebral illness. In the following paragraphs we try to understand the cognitive processes and the 
underlying cerebral network of own face recognition. 
 
2.1 Neuropsychological cases  
The mirror sign is the loss of the ability to recognize one’s reflected face in a mirror while the 
ability to recognize others’ faces often remains intact.  
This neuropsychological symptom is reported in a variety of contexts. The earliest example found 
in the literature was a 1928 report describing a 68-years-old man with senile dementia who, when 
presented with a mirror, became irritated and said, “You see, there’s the guy again!” and walked 
behind the mirror with offerings of money and tobacco in an apparent effort to cheer up the image 
(Klein, 1928).  In 1982, the first American report of the mirror sign was a case series of seven 
individuals with probable Alzheimer’s disease who exhibited the syndrome of mirrored-self 
misidentification (Foley et al., 1982). There is an association between the mirror sign and cognitive 
dysfunction. Most case reports describe patients with existing diagnoses of dementia (Hemphil, 
1948; Phillips et al., 1996).  However, the mirror sign has also been reported in patients with 
histories of traumatic brain injury, neoplasms, encephalopathy, paranoid schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, affective disorder, head trauma, epilepsy, cerebrovascular disease, 
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pituitary tumor, multiple myeloma, multiple sclerosis, viral encephalitis, frontal lobe pathology, and 
AIDS (Molchan et al., 1990; Coltheart et al. 2007). 
Recent studies have also described a legitimate mirror sign, without general cognitive decline, 
supporting the classification of mirror sign as a distinct entity (Spangenberg, 2005; Villarejo et al., 
2010). 
The potential explanations for this symptom include deficits in facial recognition, impaired spatial 
processing, decreased executive functioning (Breen et al., 2001), an impaired sense of uniqueness 
(Margariti et al. 2006), a disconnection between visual input and emotional response, conflicting 
positive and negative feelings about oneself or others (Enoch et al. 1979), confabulation, and 
generalized depersonalization or derealization (Feinberg  and Roane; Feinberg and  Keenan 2005). 
The mirror sign provides evidence that our face image is special for the brain and that specific brain 
networks are involved in its recognition.  
 
2.2 The contribution of the right hemisphere in self-face recognition 
Keenan and coworkers (1999; 2000; 2001) showed that own-face recognition is correlated with 
right hemisphere activity. 
In a first study, Keenan and coworkers (1999) submitted right handed healthy adults to a reaction 
time experiment in which they had to press three different keys when identifying either their own 
face, that of a familiar person or that of a stranger.  Participants showed shorter reaction times with 
their left than with their right responding hand when stimuli depicted their own face.  Since reaction 
times are shorter when subjects respond to stimuli that have strongly lateralized hemispheric 
processing with the hand controlled by that hemisphere (Berlucchi et al. 1997; Hodges et al. 1997), 
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it is possible to assume that the right hemisphere, controlling the left hand, plays a role in own-face 
recognition. 
As further evidence of the own-face recognition correlation with right hemisphere activity, Keenan 
and coworkers (2000) used another face identification task and again examined hand response 
differences. In this task pictures of famous faces were combined with pictures of the participants' 
face (self) and of their co-workers' face (familiar). These images were presented as a `movie' in 
which one face transformed into another. In the first instruction set, the movies began with either 
the participant's face or a co-worker's face, and the sequences gradually morphed into a famous 
face. Participants were instructed to stop the movie when the face in the sequence became famous.  
Under the second instructional set, the instructions and the order of the images were reversed. The 
movies began with the famous faces and participants had to stop the movie when it became their 
own or their familiar co-worker's image. Under the first instructional set participants responded 
significantly later to the `movie frame' when the starting image was their own face (self) and they 
were using their left hand to respond. When the movies started with the famous faces and 
participants had to stop the movie when it became their own or their familiar co-worker's image 
(Instruction set 2), a significantly earlier frame was identified in the “Self Left hand” condition.  
This study, using different dependent variables than the response times, shows that any effects 
obtained cannot be attributed to simple motor differences between hemispheres. Indeed the task 
used was sensitive to shifts in perceptual/identification biases.  
Given that there is a reaction time advantage (Keenan et al., 1999) as well as a categorization 
difference (Keenan et al., 2000) between self and familiar images when participants employ their 
left but not right hand, is possible that participants identify images as their own when the right 
hemisphere is preferentially accessed. The researchers proposed that an attentional component of 
self may be mediated by the right hemisphere. 
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With a third study, Keenan and coworkers (2001) indicated that own-face recognition selectively 
depends on neural substrates of the right hemisphere. In this study five right-handed patients were 
submitted to the Wada test, an anaesthetization of one cerebral hemisphere used to provide 
information regarding cerebral dominance for language and other cognitive phenomena. These 
patients were submitted to Wada tes before surgical treatment for epilepsy. Patients were presented 
with a picture showing a morph of a face that was composed of their own face and a famous face, 
during the time when either the right or the left hemisphere of their brain was anaesthetized. 
Patients were instructed to remember the presented picture. After recovery from anaesthesia, 
patients were given a forced-choice task in which they had to choose the picture of the face that 
they had been shown. The two choices were the pictures from which the morphed image had been 
generated (self and famous), although neither choice had actually been presented during 
anaesthesia. Following anaesthesia of the left hemisphere, all five patients selected the ‘self ’ face 
as the one they thought had been presented; however, after anaesthesia of the right hemisphere, four 
out of the five patients selected the famous face (see Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1: The original and morphing pictures used 
in the experiment and the response after 
anaesthetization of the patient’s right hemisphere 
(RH) or left hemisphere (LH). 
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To verify whether a similar effect operates in healthy participants, a second experiment was run in 
which ten normal subjects received transcranial magnetic stimulation to the motor cortex of the 
right hemisphere (RH) or left hemisphere (LH) during self–famous or familiar–famous morph 
display. The results of this experiment show that the amplitude of the resulting motor evoked 
potentials (MEPs) were significantly greater for the RH than for the LH during presentation of self 
morphs. 
All these results suggest that the right hemisphere may be critically engaged in detecting one’s own 
face, but the specific cerebral areas in the right hemisphere selectively activated by images of one’s 
own face is not clear. 
To answer this question, Uddin and coworkers (2005) submitted right-handed normal subjects to an 
event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study.  During the scan, subjects 
viewed digital morphs of their own face and a gender-matched familiar face and were instructed to 
press a button with the right hand if the image looked like their own face, and another button if it 
looked like a familiar or scrambled face. The contrast between trials containing more “self” and 
trials containing more familiar “other” against a baseline shows a signal change in the right inferior 
parietal lobule and in the right inferior frontal gyrus. 
A limitation of the above described study is that fMRI provides only correlational information about 
the relationship between a given brain area and a particular cognitive task. Causal relationships 
between brain and behavior can be tested with TMS, a technique involving transient disruption of 
normal brain activity using focal magnetic pulses that target specific brain areas. 
Uddin and coworkers (2006) used TMS to create a 'virtual lesion' over the parietal component of the 
right fronto-parietal network described above (2005) to test whether this region is necessary for 
discriminating own-faces from other familiar faces.  
18 
 
Each experimental subject participated in two TMS sessions, one for the right and one for the left 
'virtual lesions' of the inferior parietal lobules. During each session, subjects performed a behavioral 
task consisting of watching morphed images of themselves and of a familiar other. Digital morphs 
between the participant’ s face and the familiar face resulted in six unique faces, each morphed to a 
varying extent (0, 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100%). Subjects were asked to press a button if the presented 
image looked like their own face (‘self’), and another button if it looked like someone else’s face 
(‘other’). Performance before and after TMS were compared. The ‘self’ responses were defined as 
correct, if the image contained mostly the self-face (0, 20 and 40% morphs), or false alarms, if the 
image contained mostly the other face (60, 80 and 100% morphs) (see Fig. 2a). 
 
Figure 2. Examples of stimuli presented during the task (a), the cortical region (IPL) deactivated with TMS (b) (Uddin 
et al. 2006).  
 
The results of this experiment show that 1 Hz rTMS to the right inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
induced more false alarms (identifying an image containing more ‘other’ than ‘self’). On the 
contrary, applying 1 Hz rTMS to the left IPL had no effect. Thus, the right IPL appears to be an 
essential component of the neural network for visual self-other discrimination (see Fig 2b). 
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2.3 Neuropeptides and self-face recognition 
Specific cerebral areas are active during self-other discrimination but there are also specific 
neuropeptides that play an important role in this process? 
Cross-species research has demonstrated that several evolutionarily conserved neuropeptides play a 
key role in diverse social behaviors (Nelson and Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp, 2009; Bos et al., 2012). 
Among them, the neuropeptide oxytocin appears to regulate fundamental aspects of mammalian 
social affiliative behaviors and social cognition (Car-ter, 1998; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2011). In 
addition, oxytocin administration improves responsiveness to others (Kosfeld et al., 2005), and 
social behavior in individuals with autism (Guastella et al., 2010). For these reasons Colonnello and 
coworkers (2013) studied the potential role of the oxytocinergic system in blurring or enhancing the 
ability to differentiate between one's self and other's related stimuli using a placebo-controlled, 
double-blind study. 
In this study, healthy participants received either oxytocin or placebo intra-nasally and after 45min, 
the researchers measured participants' ability to differentiate their own identity while viewing a 
photo of themselves morphing into the photo of an unfamiliar face. The results of this experiment 
showed that oxytocin administration shortened the latency of self-other differentiation.  
Oxytocin therefore increases the ability to recognize differences between the self and others. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that impaired oxytocin signaling may be involved in the 
development and manifestation of human psychopathologies in which self-recognition is altered. 
 
 
 
20 
 
CHAPTER 3. SELF-BODY RECOGNITION IN ADULTS. 
 
Distinguishing one’s own bodily features from those of other people is essential to our everyday 
life. This ability is one of the key components of self-awareness and allows social interactions. 
Own-body recognition is studied using different techniques and analyzing the performance of 
patients with cerebral lesions. Below I analyze some of these different approaches. 
 
3.1 Brain activation during self-body recognition.  
In an fMRI study, Devue and coworkers (2007) measured the cerebral activity of healthy 
participants while performing a task in which they had to indicate the real appearance of themselves 
and of a close colleague among intact and altered pictures of faces and bodies. 
The first aim of this study was to examine the cortical mechanisms of visual own-face recognition. 
The lack of convergence as to precise anatomical locations underlying own-face recognition 
motivated this aim (Keenan, 1999, 2000, Turk, 2003; Pletek, 2002). Previous studies differed 
between each other with regard to the familiarity of the control face compared with the participants’ 
own face. Depending on the contrasts used in these studies, the control face was unfamiliar (Sugiura 
et al., 2000), recently learned (Sugiura et al., 2005), famous (Platek et al., 2004a) or personally 
known to the participant (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura et al., 2005; Uddin 
et al., 2005a). As the control face Devue and coworkers used personally known, gender-matched, 
people because control of familiarity is more efficient when one’s own face is compared with a 
highly familiar face. Because distinguishing two highly familiar people from each other is 
presumably very easy, the researchers designed a task in which participants would have to identify 
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their real facial appearance and that of their colleague among intact and altered pictures presented 
during a first event-related scanning session. The participants’ task consisted of an “intact–altered” 
judgment both on pictures of themselves or of a close colleague. The facial alterations consisted of 
moving the eyes inwards or outwards. 
Considering the lack of studies about own-body recognition, the second aim of  Devue’s study was 
to investigate whether specific cortical regions underlie own-body recognition compared with the 
recognition of a familiar person’s body. During a second event-related scanning session participants 
had again to identify their real body-shape appearance and that of their colleague among intact and 
altered pictures. The body alterations consisted in increasing or decreasing the waist-to-hip ratio by 
changing the width of the hips. 
The third aim of the study was to investigate which cerebral regions are selectively activated by 
self-processing regardless of presented stimulus (body or face).  For that purpose, data related to the 
participants’ own face and body were collapsed and compared with the data related to the 
processing of their colleague’s face and body. 
Finally, considering that faces and bodies are associated with distinct neural correlates, Devue and 
coworkers included two event-related control sessions in which participants passively viewed intact 
and scrambled pictures of their face or body. These two sessions allowed the researchers to 
determine the cerebral areas associated respectively with general face and body shape processing, 
along with the neural substrates associated with the processing of these two kinds of stimuli. 
In this experiment, both the cerebral activation and behavioral data were collected. In terms of 
accuracy, intact faces were better recognized than intact bodies and altered bodies were better 
recognized than intact bodies. Participants’ reaction times were faster for faces than for bodies and 
were faster for themselves than for their colleague. 
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The neuroimaging data of this experiment showed that faces and bodies elicited responses in close 
but segregated regions of the occipital cortex.  Perception of faces was associated with bilateral 
cerebral activity in the middle occipital gyrus, extending to the fusiform gyrus on the right and to 
the cerebellum on the left, as well as with activation of a large frontal area on the right side. 
Perception of bodies was associated with activity in the fusiform and lateral occipital complex 
bilaterally, and with activity in the left middle occipital gyrus. This is in agreement with previous 
studies that identified distinct regions of the extrastriate cortex that are specifically devoted to faces 
(occipital face area, OFA, Puce et al., 1996; Peelen and Downing, 2005) and bodies (extrastriate 
body area, EBA, Downing et al., 2001; Peelen and Downing, 2005). 
When comparing intact own-face with intact colleague’s face stimuli, significantly different 
responses were identified in the right inferior frontal gyrus and in the right insula. This finding is in 
line with previous studies reporting that the right inferior frontal gyrus is involved in the distinction 
between self and others (Uddin et al., 2005a) or in the attentive processing of one’s own-face 
(Sugiura et al., 2000). The implication of the right insula in visual own-face recognition was also 
reported earlier (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001). 
These results are consistent with a right hemispheric dominance model of self-recognition and self-
awareness (Keenan et al., 2000c, 2003b; Platek et al., 2004a, 2006). 
Comparing the activity elicited by intact own-body and intact colleague’s body stimuli, there were 
significant differences in response in the right superior frontal sulcus, right cingulate cortex, left 
inferior frontal gyrus, as well as in the anterior insula bilaterally.  
Finally, Devue and coworkers examined whether specific regions were implicated in the processing 
of self-related pictures independently of the stimulus domain. When activation associated with 
seeing intact stimuli depicting the colleague (faces and bodies) was subtracted from activation due 
to seeing stimuli depicting the participant herself, a significant response was found in the right 
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anterior insula and in the right dorsal anterior cingulate consistent with the literature (Fink et al., 
1996; Kircher et al., 2000, 2001;Craik et al., 1999; for a review, see Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). 
The implication of the anterior cingulate is in line with data showing that this region is involved in 
processing self facial resemblance (Plantek et al., 2005). Since this region is also implicated during 
the processing of face familiarity or self-referent information, Platek and coworkers suggested that 
this region might be generally involved when making decisions about self-referential information. 
The Devue and Platek results are also consistent with Northoff and Bermpohl (2004)’s hypothesis 
that the cingulate gyrus could play a role in abstract self-processing, that is independent of the 
stimulus domain or of the sensorial modality. 
From these results, it appears that after a partly segregated structural processing of the shape of 
faces and bodies in posterior areas, the distinction between self and others might be processed in 
more anterior regions. 
 
3.2 Neuropsychological cases 
In line with neuroimaging data, neuropsychological studies have also revealed a privileged role of 
the right hemisphere in self-recognition. Indeed, right brain-damaged (RBD) patients are more often 
impaired in awareness of their own body than left brain-damaged (LBD) patients. Indeed, patients 
with a lesion of the right hemisphere may be affected by a disorder of spatial representation and 
awareness, called unilateral neglect that may involve different sectors of space. When the deficit 
involves personal space, it is called personal neglect (Guariglia & Antonucci, 1992). In this case, 
patients do not orient attention to their contralesional hemibody and/or limbs. In addition to neglect 
or independently from it, RBD patients with left-side hemiplegia may show hemisomatognosia, 
when they deny ownership of their contralesional body parts (Meador, Loring, Feinberg, Lee, & 
Nichols, 2000;Feinberg, Haber, & Leeds, 1990), or anosognosia for hemiplegia, when they deny 
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their motor deficits (Karnath, Baier, & Nagele, 2005; Marcel, Tegner, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004; 
Bisiach, 1999; Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, & Berti, 1986).  
Taken together, neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies suggest that distinct regions of the 
extrastriate cortex are specifically devoted to faces (ventral occipital face area, OFA, Puce et al., 
1996; Peelen and Downing, 2005) and bodies (extrastriate body area, EBA, Downing et al., 2001; 
Peelen and Downing, 2005) and that one’s own body can be separately represented. Frassinetti and 
coworkers (2008) used the performance of patients with a unilateral lesion of the right or the left 
hemisphere to verify whether the right hemisphere is specialized for processing own-body parts, as 
compared to other people’s body parts. If this is the case, the ability to recognize own-body parts 
should be selectively impaired after lesion involving specific brain areas. Patients with lesion of the 
right (right brain-damaged [RBD]) or left (left brain-damaged [LBD]) hemisphere and healthy 
participants were submitted to a visual matching-to-sample. Stimuli depicted their own body parts 
or other people’s body parts. Participants were required to decide which of two vertically aligned 
images (the upper or the lower one) matched the central target stimulus.  In this experiment, explicit 
own-body recognition was not required so the paradigm indirectly evaluates the recognition of self 
body-parts. 
Neurologically healthy participants were facilitated in performing the visual matching-task when 
one of the stimuli belonged to participant’s own body compared to when they belonged to someone 
else. This effect was called ‘self-advantage’.  
Since the advantage is manifest in a task in which explicit recognition of the corporeal self is not 
necessary, this phenomenon appears to depend upon an early, possibly automatic activation of 
corporeal self-recognition processes that, once activated, may facilitate the perceptual judgments 
that are based on the visual appearance of the body and its parts. 
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In this experiment the ‘self-advantage’ was also found in left brain-damaged (LBD) patients, but 
not in right brain-damaged (RBD) patients. Moreover, RBD were impaired compared to LBD 
patients and normal subjects in visually matching their own body parts, whereas this difference was 
not evident in performing the task with other people’s body parts.  
This pattern of results indicates that the right hemisphere is preferentially involved in the 
recognition of ‘‘self body parts,’’ as patients with a lesion of the right hemisphere show difficulties 
to perform the match-to sample task with ‘‘self’’ related body parts, whereas their performance is 
comparable to that of patients with lesions to the left hemisphere when performing the same task on 
body parts belonging to other people. In this study the patients’ lesions were analyzed to verify if 
‘‘self body-parts’’ processing is subtended by a specific network. The results showed that the “self 
body-parts’’ processing involves right frontal and parietal areas. The role of these areas in this 
processing is demonstrated by the fact that these areas are damaged in RBD patients who are 
impaired in ‘‘self body-parts’’ recognition, but not in RBD patients unimpaired in this function. 
However, it was not clear whether such a right fronto-parietal network is a general network for the 
visual representation of one’s own body and body-parts, that is the ‘corporeal self’, or whether own-
face and own-body-parts processing are separate functions sub-served by different networks. If the 
corporeal self is a modular function, the ability to recognize ‘self body-parts’ and ‘self face-parts’ 
might be selectively impaired after lesion involving different and specific brain circuits. To test this 
hypothesis, Frassinetti and co-workers (2009) submitted a group of RBD patients and an age-
matched group of healthy subjects to a variant of the visual matching-to-sample task. In one 
condition, stimuli depicted the participant’s own body-parts or other people’s body-parts, whereas 
in another condition stimuli depicted the participant’s own face-parts or other people’s face-parts 
(see Fig.3) 
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Figure 3 An example of stimuli representing face-parts (a) and body-parts (b). Participants were required to decide 
which of the two images (the upper or the lower one) matched the central target stimulus, presented within a black 
frame (taken from Frassinetti et al., 2009). 
 
First of all, this study showed that healthy participants were more accurate in processing pictures 
representing their own as compared to other people’s body- and face parts, showing the so-called 
self-advantage. These results confirm previous findings of Frassinetti and coworker (2008).  The 
second result of this study is that RBD patients revealed a simple dissociation, in that some patients 
who were impaired in processing self-related body parts showed a preserved self-advantage in 
processing self-related face-parts, thus providing initial evidence of a modular representation of the 
corporeal self.  
The idea that the visual representation of the corporeal self is based on a modular functional 
organization is in accordance with both neuropsychological studies in RBD patients affected by 
anosognosia and with neuroimaging findings in neurologically healthy subjects. Indeed, patients 
with anosognosia can be unaware of their motor deficit at the contralesional lower limb, but not at 
the contralesional upper limb (Von Hagen and Ives, 1937; Berti et al., 1996; see, for review, Vallar 
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and Ronchi, 2006). Similarly, multiple circuits, involving right posterior and frontal regions, play 
different roles in the visual recognition of one’s own body (Sugiura et al., 2006). 
Finally to identify the brain network of the self-advantage in body-parts, Frassinetti and coworkers 
(2010) divided RBD patients into two groups on the basis of the absence (G1) or presence (G2) of 
self-advantage in body-parts processing. The analysis of cerebral lesions of the two groups showed 
that areas involved by G1 patients’ lesions were more anterior and ventral compared to those 
involved by G2 patients’ lesions. Moreover, the self-related areas, as previously identified by a 
subtraction method on a larger sample of patients (Frassinetti et al., 2008), were plotted against the 
same template showing substantial sparing of these areas in G2, and a partial overlap with G1 
patients’ lesions. 
The above studies investigate the recognition of bodily self through the physical appearance but in 
our daily life we can recognize our body not only for its image but also for other information that 
are simultaneously presented, like our bodily movement or our bodily emotional expression. The 
following study analyzed how this additional information can modulate the self-advantage for own 
body image. 
Frassinetti and coworkers (2009) investigated whether the visual information provided by the 
movement of self body-parts may be separately processed by right brain-damaged (RBD) patients 
and constitute a valuable cue to reduce their deficit in self body-parts processing. To pursue these 
aims, a group of RBD patients and a group of neurological healthy subjects were submitted to a 
matching-task in two conditions. In the dynamic condition, participants were shown pair of movies 
of moving self or other’s body-parts (hand, foot, arm and leg). In the static condition, participants 
were shown pair of still images of the same self or other’s body-parts. In each condition the task 
consisted of deciding whether the two stimuli in the pair were physically the ‘Same’ or ‘Different’, 
regardless of the self/other identity (see Fig. 4). 
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Figure 4 (a) One example of each stimulus category depicting different body-parts, as presented the static condition. (b) 
Schematic representation of the time-sequence of events for each trial. 
The results of this experiment showed that in healthy participants, the self-advantage was present 
both in the dynamic and static condition, but it was more important in the dynamic condition. 
Interestingly, in RBD patients self-advantage was absent in the static, but present in the dynamic 
condition. These findings suggest that visual information from self body-parts in motion may be 
processed independently in patients with impaired static self-processing, thus pointing to a modular 
organization of the mechanisms responsible for the self/other distinction. 
These result are in line with Sugiura’s fMRI study (2006), which supported the existence of a right 
parieto-frontal network with higher sensitivity for self-related movies than pictures, and a more 
posterior network with higher sensitivity for static self-pictures than movies.  
Thus it is possible that multiple brain networks support visual self-recognition, pointing to a 
modular organization of the mechanisms responsible for self/other distinction. Therefore, if it is not 
possible to recognize ourselves using physical cues we can use other information. 
These studies (Frassinetti et al. 2008, 2009, 2010) have demonstrated the human ability to implicitly 
recognize one’s own body. But which is the mechanism at the basis of the self-advantage effect?  
The authors (Frassinetti et al., 2011) tested the hypothesis that the implicit self-advantage revealed 
by the visual matching task is not merely due to visual perceptual facilitation, but may be due to a 
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combination of visual, somatosensory, proprioceptive, and motor information. According to this 
hypothesis, the body self-advantage should emerge when self-body recognition is implicitly 
required and should be specific for body-parts and not for inanimate-objects. In contrast, if the self-
advantage is due to a mere visual–perceptual facilitation, it should be independent of the implicit or 
explicit request (and could be extended also to objects). To disentangle these hypotheses, healthy 
participants were implicitly or explicitly required to recognize either their own body-parts or 
inanimate-objects. The Implicit task was the same task previously described. In the Explicit task, 
two stimuli depicting the same body-parts or the same type of inanimate-object, matched for visual 
similarity, were simultaneously presented in each trial, in the upper and the lower position. A white 
frame replaced the central target stimulus. Participants were requested to indicate whether the upper 
or the lower image corresponded to their own body-parts or object, and to press a central response 
key, when neither image corresponded to their own stimuli (see Fig. 5). 
 
 
Figure 5  a An example of a single trial. b Examples of the experimental stimuli. For each category (body-effectors and 
inanimate objects). 
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Participants were more accurate in the implicit task with self rather than with others’ body-parts. In 
contrast, the self-advantage was not found when an explicit recognition of one’s own body-parts 
was required, suggesting that the body self-advantage relies upon a sensorimotor, rather than a mere 
visual representation of one’s own body. Moreover, the absence of both self/ other and 
implicit/explicit effects, when processing inanimate- objects, underlines the differences between the 
body and other objects. 
These findings were further confirmed by a behavioural and an fMRI study (Ferri et al., 2011; Ferri 
et al., 2012). In the first study (Ferri et al., 2011) the implicit and explicit self-hand recognition were 
compared. Participants were submitted to a laterality judgment task (implicit task) of self and 
others’ hands.  
In this task participants were requested to report the laterality (left or right) of hands presented in 
different angular orientations (0°, 60°, 120°, 180°, 240°, 300°).  In order to perform this task 
participants simulate a motor rotation of the body parts so as to match that of the observed stimulus. 
Previous studies have showed that the mental motor rotation of body parts shares the same temporal 
and kinematic properties with actual body rotation in space (Decety et al. 1991; Parsons 1994). This 
idea is also corroborated by evidence showing that longer mental rotation times are needed for 
stimuli orientations corresponding to body part positions difficult to be maintained (Petit et al., 
2003). Considering that left-right judgment of body parts relies upon the visuo-motor representation 
of one’s own body (Cooper et al.1975), Ferri and coworkers hypothesized that the laterality 
judgment should be easier when the displayed stimulus is one’s own hand. Indeed, only in this case, 
the displayed stimulus matches with the mentally rotated hand (self-advantage).  
In the explicit task, the same participants were submitted to an explicit recognition of own hands. 
Participants were required to explicitly judge whether the same stimuli used for the first task (self 
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and other’s hands presented in different angular orientations) corresponded or not to their own hand 
(see Fig. 6) 
 
Figure 6 Experimental stimuli consisted of pictures depicting the dorsal view of right and left hands in six different 
clockwise orientations. 
 
Images of participant’s hands or of three other people’s hands were presented one at a time in ‘self’ 
trials and ‘other’ trials, respectively. 
In the first experiment participants showed faster reaction times when judging one ʼ s own right 
hand compared with all the other hand stimuli, regardless of the magnitude of the rotation. This 
self-advantage was not present when participants performed the explicit self-recognition. 
Furthermore in the first task, the classical bell-shaped function of RTs constitutes the behavioral 
signature of mental rotation. On the other hand, the absence of such a function in the RTs of the 
second task shows that a motor simulation is not required to accomplish the explicit task. 
Thus, Ferri and coworkers confirmed that implicit and explicit recognition of the bodily-self 
dissociate and that only an implicit recognition of the bodily self is mapped in motor terms. This 
motor representation allows the self-advantage to emerge. 
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When subjects imagine their own hand rotating into the stimulus position, the imagined body part is 
translated into its motor representation, engaging sensorimotor rather than visual processes (de 
Lange, Helmich, & Toni, 2006) 
In an fMRI study, Ferri and coworkers (2012) used the same hand laterality judgment task to verify 
whether mental rotation of pictures depicting oneʼs own hands leads to a different activation of the 
sensorimotor areas as compared with the mental rotation of pictures depicting others’ hands. The 
researcher found that the general representation of the bodily self encompasses the SMA and pre-
SMA, the anterior insula, and the occipital cortex, bilaterally. Crucially, the representation of oneʼs 
own dominant hand seems to be confined within the left premotor cortex.  (see Fig. 7) 
 
Figure 7 Regions showing higher activation during the mental rotation of oneʼs own right hand as compared with the 
mental rotation of oneʼs own left and otherʼs hand. Group activation data are rendered on the cortical surface of a 
“canonical” brain (Mazziotta et al., 1995).  
 
This data seem to support the existence of a sense of bodily self, encased within the sensorimotor 
system. The researchers propose that such a sensorimotor representation of the bodily self might 
help us to differentiate our own body from that of others. 
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CHAPTER 4. BODY SELF-RECOGNITION IN DEVELOPMENTAL AGE 
 
 
In the literature, corporeal self recognition in adults is well documented. As described above some 
behavioral and neuroimaging studies have shown the cognitive cerebral network underpinning this 
ability in adult subjects. However the development of this ability is less well studied. 
Most of the developmental studies addressing self-recognition focused on mirror self-recognition 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Lewis & Brooks, 1978; Marsh, Ellis, & Craven, 
2002). These studies showed that by the middle of the second year, when facing their own specular 
image, young children begin to manifest clear signs of a conceptual sense of their own public 
appearance. They display unambiguous self-referencing behaviors when a spot of rouge has been 
surreptitiously placed on their face and they begin to show embarrassment while viewing their own 
mirror reflection (Bertenthal & Fisher, 1978; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). These behaviors 
demonstrated the emergence of an explicit self-awareness in infants aged 14–18 months. 
But what development precedes and eventually prepares infants to manifest explicit self-
knowledge? 
Rochat and Striano (2002) suggest that an implicit sense of self is developing from birth, long 
before children begin to manifest explicit (conceptual) self-knowledge by the second year.  
Observing infants of least 3 months of age, placed in front of mirrors, it is possible see that they 
tend to engage in long bouts of self-exploration, observing their own movements and it seems that 
they enjoy the experience of visual–proprioceptive contingency afforded by mirrors. They manifest 
positive affect, including smiling, reaching for the part of the body reflected in the mirror, and often 
demonstrating sudden bursts of joyful activities (Amsterdam, 1972).  
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Other research has shown that young infants are responsive to particular aspects of their own 
specular image.  
Schulman and Kaplowitz (1976) showed that prior to 6 months of age, infants tended to look more 
often at a clear rather than a blurred image of themselves, and show less interest in the distorted 
image compared with the flat non distorted mirror image. 
Distorted and non distorted mirror images both have visual–proprioceptive contingency, so it is 
possible that young infants might already be able to discriminate between specular images that are 
spatially more or less eccentric relative to what they calibrated of their own body via direct visual 
exploration of limb movements. 
In a study conducted in 2002, Rochat and Striano placed 4- and 9-month-old infants facing a live 
image either of themselves or of another person (experimenter) mimicking them.  
All the infants appeared to perceive and act differentially when facing the specular image of 
themselves or of another person (experimenter) mimicking them. From 4 months of age, infants 
smile more, look more, and have more protracted first-look duration toward the others’ than self-
stimuli. Since children look longer to novel than already known stimuli (Fantz, 1964; Harel, 
Gordon, Geva, & Feldman, 2010), it is assumed that the images depicting others’ bodies are novel 
compared to self-body stimuli. This evidence suggests that already at 4 months of age the children 
have gained a certain level of knowledge about their body image and then that there could be a 
developmental progression from a self-other differentiation to an explicit identification of the self-
image as self-awareness over the first year of life. 
There is now good evidence that infants discriminate between perceptual events that are either self- 
or not self-produced early on. Rochat and Hespos (1997) tested newborn infants within 24 hours 
from their birth to see whether they would manifest a discrimination between double touch 
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stimulation specifying themselves, and external (one way) tactile stimulation specifying non-self 
objects. The experimenters used the robust rooting response all healthy infants manifest from birth 
and by which tactile stimulation at the corner of the mouth is followed by the infant’s head turn 
with mouth opening toward the stimulation. Following a simple procedure, the experimenters 
recorded the frequency of rooting in response to either external tactile stimulation, the experimenter 
stroking the infant’s cheek, or in response to tactile self-stimulation when infants spontaneously 
brought one of their hands in contact with their cheek. The results showed that newborns tended to 
manifest rooting responses almost three times more often in response to external compared to self-
stimulation. These observations suggest that already at birth, infants pick up the intermodal 
invariants (single touch or double touch combined with proprioception) that specify self- versus 
external stimulation, showing evidence of an early sense of their own body, hence an early 
perceptually-based sense of themselves as differentiated entities. 
Implicit self-recognition also seems to persist in adulthood (Frassinetti et al. 2008, 2010) passing 
from childhood.  
Frassinetti and coworkers (2011) investigated the bodily-self processing in 4–17 year old children 
and the development of its neuronal bases, submitting typically developing children and unilateral 
brain damaged children (5 right and 12 left sided) to the visual matching-to-sample task described 
above (Frassinetti et al., 2008). The results of this study showed that healthy children performed the 
task better with self than with other people’s stimuli, showing a benefit of self processing for both 
body and face. 
Regarding brain damaged children, a double dissociation was found: right brain damaged patients 
were impaired in self but not in other people’s body parts, showing a self-disadvantage, whereas left 
brain damaged patients were impaired in others’ but not in self body parts processing. These results 
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support the hypothesis that during development, self and others’ body parts processing are different 
and sustained by separate cerebral substrates.  
Comparing this result with the neural correlates of the corporeal self as identified in adults, it is 
possible to note that neural correlates of the corporeal self in children are only partially similar to 
those previously identified in adults (Frassinetti et al., 2008). Indeed, the present results on children 
suggest that, as in adulthood, the right hemisphere is specialized in processing “self”, while the left 
hemisphere is specialized in processing “others”’ body-parts. Differently, left hemisphere damage 
in adults seems not to be related to “others”’ body-parts processing. 
The difference between the performance of adults and child LBD patients have two possible 
explanations. The first one would be the possibility that a specific module to recognize others’ body 
parts is functional only during development, disappearing when the brain achieves full maturation. 
The temporary functionality of this module selective for others’ body parts would be related to the 
need to fully acquire self/other distinction capability along development. The second possibility to 
explain this difference would be that the lesion location in the two studies is different. Observing 
the children’s anatomical graphic representations of this study and lesions in Frassinetti et al. 
(2008), it is notable that the adult’s lesions were more anterior than the children’s ones.  
Finally, the third result of this study is that own-body and own-face parts processing seem separate 
to others’ body and others’ face-parts processing. Indeed, when compared with controls, RBD 
children were impaired in self-body but not in own-face processing and LBD patients were 
impaired in others’ body but not in other’s face parts processing. This means that self-recognition in 
RBD children and other-recognition in LBD children are not impaired when the stimulus 
represented is a face. So, the corporal self during development also seems dissociated for body and 
face-parts. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE INTERPERSONAL REGULATION OF OWN PERSONAL SPACE 
During social interaction people automatically regulate the distance maintained between themselves 
and others. This distance is called personal or interpersonal space.  
5.1 What is the interpersonal space? 
Edward T. Hall first described the concept of interpersonal space in 1959. Interpersonal space can 
be defined as an invisible zone surrounding a person, which allows that person to regulate his 
interactions with other people. This invisible zone can be envisioned as a bubble around a person.  
Hall identified in the “bubble” four zones: Intimate, Personal, Social and Public (see Fig. 8). The 
Intimate Zone ranges from touching to about 18 inches (46 cm) apart and it is reserved for lovers, 
children, as well as close family members. The Personal Zone begins about an arm's length away; 
starting around 18 inches (46 cm) from the person and ending about 4 feet (122 cm) away. This 
space can be used in conversations with friends or to chat with associates. The Social Zone ranges 
from 4 to 8 feet (1.2 m - 2.4 m) away from the person and it is reserved for strangers and new 
acquaintances. The Public Zone includes anything more than 8 feet (2.4 m) away, and it is used for 
speeches, lectures, and theater. 
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Figure 8: Diagram of Edward T. Hall's personal reaction bubbles (1966), showing radius in feet and meters. 
 
Most of the time, a person becomes aware of his or her interpersonal space by the feeling of 
irritation or malaise when another person invades his/her space without permission or with the 
wrong intention. 
 
5.2 How do you measure the interpersonal space? 
Personal space can be measured in different ways such as with projective techniques, unobtrusive 
observation of natural spacing or with the stop-distance procedure (Hayduk, 1981a, 1981b, 1983). 
The projective measures include: silhouette placements, Kuethe's (1964) felt figure placements, 
Duke and Nowicki's (1972) "comfortable interpersonal distance" and the CID scale. The CID scale 
is a piece of paper with eight lines extending out from a central hub. Subjects imagine they are 
standing on the hub and place marks on the lines indicating the minimum distances for which they 
would be comfortable with another's approach (Pedersen, 1973). Projective measures (requiring 
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manipulation of miniature figures, silhouettes, dolls, or paper and pencil drawings) are particularly 
vulnerable to methodological criticism because they do not directly involve real human spacing.  
On the other hand, during the stop-distance procedure the subject approaches or is approached by an 
assistant until the subject just begins to feel uncomfortable about the nearness of the other. 
 Although the stop-distance procedure is not conducted in naturalistic settings, it is one of the 
measures most frequently used because it is reliable, measures preferred interpersonal distance 
under varied conditions and allows for standard testing conditions and repeated measures (for 
reviews see Aiello, 1987; and Hayduk, 1983).  
 
5.3 The normal and pathological variations of the interpersonal space. 
The size of the interpersonal space is found to vary as a function of such variables as the age, the 
sex, the familiarity between interacting parties, the reason of the interaction or the intercultural 
differences (Hall, 1966; Watson, 1970; Cristani et al., 2001; Beaulieu, 2004). 
Some researchers showed that there are significant differences in personal space between children 
of different ages. For example Lomranz and coworker (1975) measures in an ecological context 3, 
5, and 7 year old children’s personal space when they approached boys or girls of their own age. 
The researcher found that the 3-year-old subjects kept less distance from their age peers rather than 
5- or 7-year-old ones. For all subjects, irrespective of age, the sex of the interacting child was 
relevant, in that less distance was kept from girls than from boys. These results were explained 
considering that girls are expected to be more reserved and socially less aggressive and that mothers 
in our culture are the central figures with whom the child comes in contact. Also Weinstein (1971) 
found that kindergarten (age 5) and first-grade children keep less distance from a same-sex peer 
than do second and third graders. Finally some studies showed that from 5 years of age, there is a 
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gradual increase in the space used for interpersonal interaction (Okano, 1985; Folarin, 1989; Pegan 
& Aiello, 1982; Sara.no & Helmuth, 1981) and at about 12 years of age, the characteristics of 
children’s personal space become similar to those of adults (Aiello, 1987). 
Another variable could modify the interpersonal space: the first kind of physical proximity 
maintained with a caregiver. The infant’s confidence in the accessibility of its attachment figures is 
considered an important modifier to the setting of its proximity set-goals. For example, Cassidy and 
Berlin (1994) observed that infants and children classified as insecure-ambivalent employ an 
adaptive strategy of maintaining close proximity to their attachment figure. In discussing possible 
consequences of avoidant attachment, Main (1990) suggested that physical or emotional rejection 
on the part of the attachment figure might lead to avoidance and distance-maintaining strategies in 
the infant. Later in life, strategies that infants use to regulate proximity to their attachment figures 
may become internally represented in their working models of interpersonal relationships. 
Therefore, secure or insecure attachment in infancy may lead to different strategies for personal 
space regulation. In line with the previous study, Bar-Haim Y and coworkers (2002) showed that 
children who had an insecure attachment relationship in infancy displayed smaller personal space 
boundaries, and tolerated larger intrusions into their personal space as compared with children who 
had secure attachments in infancy. The authors explained the insecure children behavior as an 
infants’ preoccupation and uncertainty regarding the availability and responsiveness of their 
attachment figures. 
It was also demonstrated that psychiatric and neurological illness (Deus, 2006; Kennedy et al. 2009) 
as well as developmental psychological or neurological disorder (Vranic, 2003; Kennedy & 
Adolphs) can interfere with the regulation of interpersonal space. 
In this respect, Kennedy and coworker (2009) described the regulation of interpersonal distance in a 
patient (SM) with bilateral amygdala damage. In their experiment, Kennedy and coworker asked to 
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SM to indicate the position at which she felt most comfortable as a female experimenter approached 
her or she approached experimenter, controlling the gaze direction (direct/averted) and the starting 
position (close/far). SM showed a reduced personal space compared to both any comparison subject 
and the control group. Finally, to better investigate the patient’s lack of discomfort at close 
distances, the authors asked her to rate her level of comfort/discomfort standing at different 
distances from the experimenter. With this questionnaire, the author discovered that even when SM 
and the experimenter stayed in nose-to-nose distance with direct eye contact, SM stated to be 
perfectly comfortable.  
This study showed that the bilateral damage to the amygdala results in no detectable personal space 
boundary and an abnormally small interpersonal distance preference, suggesting that this area is  a 
vital brain substrate for proximity. This hypothesis is consistent with the results found in monkeys 
with bilateral amygdala lesions, who stay within closer proximity to other monkeys or people 
(Kluver et al. 1937; Emery  et al., 2001; Mason et al. 2006) 
To further demonstrate that amygdala activity is useful in regulating interpersonal distance, 
Kennedy and coworkers conducted an fMRI study in which they found that the amygdala responded 
to a greater degree when the participants knew that an experimenter was maintaining a close 
distance to them compared to when they knew that an experimenter was maintaining a far distance.   
Taken together, these data showed that the amygdala is vital for human adults to regulate their 
interpersonal distance. However, since the developmental course of SM's lesion is unknown, 
Kennedy and coworker’s results (2009) cannot demonstrate if the amygdala is necessary for 
triggering innate emotional responses to close others or learning the association between close 
distances and aversive outcomes. To answer this question, it would be useful to study this 
mechanism in children with typical and atypical development. 
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CHAPTER 6. RECOGNITION OF OWN FACE AND BODY IN AUTISM 
6.1 Introduction 
For humans social life it is vital not only to recognize socially relevant stimuli, such as faces (Grill-
Spector et al., 2004; Gauthier et al., 2000) and bodies (Urgesi et al., 2004; Downing et al., 2001; 
Peelen & Downing 2004; Schwarzlose et al., 2005), but also to distinguish between ourselves and 
other.  
Several psychological studies suggest that the progress in cognitive skills, leads infant to mature the 
awareness of being a separate entity early on (Mahler, 1975; Neisser, 1991). This is the first step of 
the self-recognition and the self-awareness. Much research documents the emergence by 14 to 18 
months of behaviours indicating self-recognition in mirrors or in other reflective surfaces 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004). However, recent research seems to support the 
hypothesis that infants develop self-other discrimination in specular images long before mirror self-
recognition (Rochat & Striano, 2002). Rochat & Striano (2002) found that from 4 months of age, 
infants appeared to perceive and act differentially when facing the specular image of themselves or 
of another person (experimenter) mimicking them. Infants smile more, look more, and have more 
protracted first-look duration toward the others’ than self-stimuli. Since children look longer to 
novel than already known stimuli (Fantz, 1964; Harel et al., 2010), it is assumed that the images 
depicting others’ bodies are novel compared to self-body stimuli. This evidence suggests that 
already at 3-4 months of age the children have gained a certain level of knowledge about their body 
image and then that there could be a developmental progression from a self-others differentiation to 
an explicit identification of the self-image as self-awareness over the first few years of life. 
As far as studies exploring self/other face/body processing in pre-schooler and scholar children, Sui 
and Zhu (2005) found a self-reference advantage in memory in children as young as 5 years old. 
The authors asked children to study a list of colourful object pictures presented together with self or 
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other’s face images. When incidental free recall of objects was carried out, the children were more 
accurate to recall objects associated with self compared to others’ face images. This self-advantage 
was found in 5 but not in 4 year old children. 
If, as descrived in Chapter 1, the distinction of the self from others is a key aspect of social 
behaviour and is a precursory ability of later conceptual self-development (Rochat & Striano, 
2002), it is interesting to investigate these functions in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD).  
Experimental studies on self awareness in autistic children report contradictory results. Some 
studies have highlighted the difficulty of these children with the concept of self, of other and of 
interaction self-other (Mitchell & O’Keefe, 2008; Millward et al., 2000; Frith & Frith, 1999; Lee & 
Hobson, 1998; Uddin et al., 2008). In contrast, other studies have shown a preserved self-other 
processing (Neuman & Hill, 1978; Dawson & McKissick, 1984; Spiker & Ricks, 1984; Ferrari & 
Matthews, 1983; Zamagni et al., 2011). Numerous studies have demonstrated that self-awareness is 
a multidimensional function. Mental components of self-awareness, essential to social cognition, as 
for example the use of pronouns (Fay, 1979), the mental judgment (Happè & Frith, 1996; Mitchell 
and O’Keefe, 2008, Williams et al., 2010), and the autobiographical memory (Crane, et al., 2010; 
Millward et al., 2000) are impaired in ASD (Frith, 2003), on the contrary concrete aspects of self-
awareness, as the bodily self-recognition, are unimpaired in autism. 
A number of studies, suggest that the mental aspects of self-awareness are diminished and/or 
atypical in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). For instance, individuals with ASD have difficulty 
identifying and reflecting on their own mental states (Frith & Happe´ 1999), as well as their own 
emotions (Ben Shalom et al. 2003; Gaigg & Bowler 2008; Hill et al. 2004). Moreover several 
studies showed a diminished ability to explicitly differentiate themselves from otherselves using 
personal pronouns (Jordan 1989; Kanner 1943; Lee et al. 1994). 
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However, not all aspects of self-awareness are impaired in ASD. Indeed children with ASD are able 
to compare the currently perceived mirror or specular self-image with the mental representation of 
their bodily self-image (Povinelli, 2001). In this respect there is converging evidence (Ferrari & 
Matthews, 1983; Spiker & Ricks, 1984) demonstrating that children with ASD recognize own 
image in the mirror at the same mental age of typical developmental children. Moreover 
Dissanayake and co-workers (2010) have shown that ASD and TD children between 5 and 9 years 
were equally able to recognize themselves in delayed video feedback showing a memory of their 
own appearance. In line with the previous results also Lind and Bowler (2009) have found a 
preserved temporally extended self-awareness in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Lind and Bowler 
(2009) have shown an unimpaired performance in ASD on the delayed self-recognition, despite 
showing significant impairments in theory-of-mind task performance, and a reduced propensity to 
use personal pronouns to refer to themselves. 
The above mentioned studies investigate only an explicit recognition of own body but our body 
could be recognized also in an implicit way. For this reasons here we investigate the implicit bodily 
self-recognition a concrete aspect of the self-awareness. As described in Chapter 3, previous studies 
have demonstrated that healthy adults are more accurate in implicitly processing pictures 
representing their own as compared to other people’s body- and face parts, showing the so-called 
“self-advantage” (Frassinetti et al.,2008 2010). As described in Chapter 3, this self-advantage is due 
to an implicit self-recognition because in this studies was never required an explicit recognition.  
In the present study, children with ASD were submitted to a visual matching-to sample task 
similar to that previously used to assess the implicit access to the  bodily self-image in adults 
(Frassinetti et al., 2008; Frassinetti et al., 2010). Stimuli depicted the participant’s own body (hands, 
feet) or face (eyes, mouths) parts or other people’s body or face-parts. Participants were required to 
decide which of two vertically aligned images (the upper or the lower one) matched the central 
target stimulus. An explicit recognition of their body (face) parts was never required. The 
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performance of children with ASD was compared with the performance of two control groups 
matched for mental and chronological age.  
We predicted that TD children  would perform the task better when they visually matched 
their own, compared to others’ body and face-parts, showing the so-called “self-advantage”. If, 
according to our hypothesis, bodily self-advantage is a preserved function in ASD children, we 
expect that autistic children will show the self-advantage as well as TD children. More specifically, 
concerning face stimuli, since eyes and mouth are differently processed in ASD and TD children 
(Pelphrey et al., 2002; Joseph & Tanaka, 2003), a different influence of ownership on these face-
parts processing was expected.  Indeed, people with autism show a distinct gaze pattern when 
looking at faces, spending more time at the mouth and often looking less into the eyes (Pelphrey et 
al., 2002). Thus, we expect that autistic children will elaborate better mouth than eyes.  
 
6.2 Material and methods  
Participants 
The 55 children who participated in this study were assigned to three experimental groups. The first 
group included 17 children with autism syndrome selected from two Centres for children with ASD  
(Prato and Reggio Emilia, Italy). They will hereby be designated as the group of individuals with 
ASD. They were diagnosed according to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) criteria for autism. The ADOS-
G scale (Lord, et al., 2000), given by a trained clinical psychologist, defined all participants as ASD 
children. None of them had known associated medical disorders at the time of testing and the visual 
examination was found to be normal.  IQ scores were measured with the WISC-R, submitted to 
children in a session differ from the experimental session. The total score (IQ-T) (verbal and 
performance) of 13 ADS children ranged from 43 to 72 (mean 62.15; SD=8.48). The score of 
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performance (IQ-p) of the other 4 ASD children, unable to perform the verbal tests, ranged from 43 
to 59 (mean 49.5; SD=6.8).  
Two control groups of typical developing individuals were recruited for the experiment: the first 
group was constituted of 20 typical developing individuals matched for mental age (TD1) and the 
second group of 18 typical developing individuals matched for chronological age (TD2). TD 
children were  recruited in a school. 
The ASD children were chronologically older than TD1 children  (average ASD=12.8 years, 
sd=3.7; TD1=8,5 years, sd= 2.21, F1, 35=18.74, p<.001) but they were not different for their mental 
age
1
 (average mental age ASD=8,2 years, sd=1.3 years; TD1=8,2 years, sd= 2.2, F1, 35=0.1, p=.75).   
The ASD and TD2 groups did not differ with respect to chronological age (average ASD=12.8 
years, sd=3.7; TD2=13.6 years old, sd=2.4, F1, 33=0.65, p=.42) but they were different for their 
mental age (average mental age ASD=8,2 years, sd=1.3 years; TD2=12,89 years, sd= 2.42, F1, 
35=50.85, p<.001).  Participants’ parents gave informed consent to their children’s participation in 
the study, which was approved by the local ethics committee. All procedures were in agreement 
with the 1975 Helsinki Declaration.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Stimuli were grey-scale pictures taken with a digital camera in a session prior to the experiment (1 
week before). This session was conducted in a room with constant artificial light and a fixed 
distance between the camera lens and the stimuli (40 cm), which were always photographed in the 
same position. The original photos were modified by means of Adobe Photoshop software, 
equalized for luminance/contrast and presented on a uniform white background.  The picture size 
                                                             
1 The mental age  was calculated, on the score of performance (IQ-p), by using the formula (chronological age X 
IQ/100) 
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was 230 X 220 pixels. Stimuli represented body-parts (hands, feet) or face-parts (eyes, mouths) that 
could be other people’s parts (other) or the subject’s parts (self). Other people’s stimuli were 
matched for size, skin color, chronological age, and gender, in comparison with each participant’s 
stimuli. Stimuli that served as own body/face for one participant were used as other’s face/body for 
a different participant. 
In each trial three stimuli of the same category were simultaneously presented up-right, vertically 
aligned along the vertical meridian of the computer screen. The central stimulus was presented in a 
black frame and corresponded to the target stimulus. Each trial started with a central fixation cross 
and the experimenter started a new trial only when the participant was ready. Participants were 
tested individually in a quiet room. Participants sat in front of the computer screen, at a distance of 
about 30 cm, and were required to decide which of the two images (the upper or the lower one) 
matched the central target stimulus (un-speeded forced-choice paradigm). Trial duration was not 
limited and no time pressure was exerted on subjects’ performance.  The accuracy of participant’ s 
verbal responses was recorded by the experimenter, pressing a response key. (see Fig. 9). 
 
Figure 9: An example of stimuli used: body-parts 
(a) and face-parts (b). Participants were required 
to decide which of the two images (the upper or 
the lower one) matched the central target 
stimulus. 
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Stimulus presentation and randomization in a block were controlled using E-prime V1.1 software 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) running on a computer. The experiment  consisted 
of two blocks (48 trials each), one with body-parts and the other block with face-parts. In both 
blocks, half of the trials contained at least one stimulus representing the participant’s own 
body/face-part (‘self’ trials), whereas the other half contained stimuli representing body/face-part 
from three other people (‘other’ trials). To rule out the possibility that higher repetition rates of 
self compared to others’ stimuli led to a “priming” effect during the task, in each block self 
stimuli appeared the same number of times than each of the other individual’s stimuli. 
In the block with body parts, stimuli were counterbalanced for side of the body (i.e., left and right). 
The order of blocks was randomised among participants. 
 
6.3 Results 
To investigate self-advantage in children with typical development (TD-1 and TD-2) and in 
children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), an ANOVA
2
 was conducted, with Group (ASD, 
TD1 and TD2 children) as between-subject variable and with Stimuli (Body, Face) and Ownership 
(Self, Other) as within-variables. Pair wise comparisons were conducted with the “Tukey honest for 
unequal N” test when necessary. Effect size is provided as partial eta square.  
Furthermore, the performance of each group was separately investigated to explore whether a 
specific single body- or face-part is better processed than another body- or face-parts. To 
characterise the performance of each group, separate ANOVAs were conducted on error percentage, 
with Body-Part-Type (foot, hand) or Face-Part-Type (eyes, mouth) and Ownership as within-
subjects variables. 
                                                             
2 The error percentages were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov d<0.22, p>0.2 in each group), and therefore, 
comparisons were performed using parametric statistical test.   
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ASD and TD children matched for mental (TD-1) and chronological age (TD-2)  
The variable  GROUP [F (2,52) = 18.74; p < .0001; ηp
2 
= .42] was significant: ASD children  
showed a significant higher error rate (12%) than TD-1 (4%) and TD-2 (3%) children (p < .0001, 
for both comparisons). The two controls groups were not statistically different (p=.84). Moreover, 
the variable Ownership [F (1,52) = 35.34; p < .0001; ηp
2 
= .41] was significant. The error rate was 
significantly lower with self  than with others’ stimuli (4% vs 8%; self-advantage effect). The 
variable Stimuli and the interactions between the three variables were no significant (see Fig. 10). 
 
 
Figure 10 : a) Mean percentages of error in ASD (autism spectrum disorder) and TD (typically development) children 
matched with pathological group for mental age (TD-1) and chronological age (TD-2). b) Mean percentages of error in 
recognition of self and others’ stimuli. Bars represent s.e.m. (standard error mean) inter-subjects. 
 
ASD children 
The variable Ownership was significant both when Body-Part-Type [F (1,16) = 6.06; p < .03; ηp
2 
= 
.27] (self =11% vs. Other= 16%) and when Face-Part-Type were analysed [F (1,16) = 7.32; p < .02; 
ηp
2 
= .31] (self =9% vs. Other= 13%) (see Fig.3a). The variables Body-Part-Type was not 
significant whereas the variable Face-Part-Type was significant [F (1,16) = 10.02; p < .001; ηp
2 
= 
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.38] (eyes =% 14 vs. mouth= 8%) The interactions Body and Face-Part-Type with the variable 
Ownership were not significant. 
 
TD 1 children (same mental age) 
The variable Ownership was significant both when Body-Part-Type [F (1,19) = 7.65; p < .01; ηp
2 
= 
.28] (self =2% vs. Other= 6%) and when Face-Part-Type were analysed [F (1,19) = 6.59; p < .02; ηp
2 
= .26] (self =2% vs. Other= 6%) (see Fig.3b). The variables Body-Part-Type and Face-Part-Type as 
well as their interaction with the variable Ownership were not significant. 
 
TD 2 children (same chronological age) 
The variable Ownership was significant both when Body-Part-Type [F (1,17) = 7.27; p < .02; ηp
2 
= 
.30] (self =2% vs. Other= 4%) and when Face-Part-Type were analysed [F (1,17) = 4.55; p < .05; ηp
2 
= .20] (self =1% vs. Other= 3%) (see Fig.3c). The variables Body-Part-Type and Face-Part-Type as 
well as their interaction with the variable Ownership were not significant (see Fig. 11). 
 
 
Figure 11: Mean percentages of error in recognition of self and other people’s body-parts and face-parts in each group: a) 
ASD, children with autism spectrum disorder; b), TD-1, children with typical development, matched with ASD children 
for mental age; c) TD-2, children with typical development, matched with ASD children for chronological age. Bars 
represent s.e.m. (standard error mean) inter-subjects. 
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6.5. Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether the implicit self body/ face parts recognition 
is present also in children with autism. To this aim ASD and TD children were submitted to a 
modified version of the visual matching-to sample task, previously used to indirectly assess the 
functioning of adult bodily self-processing (Frassinetti et al., 2008; Frassinetti et al., 2010).  
The first result of the present study is that TD children showed an advantage in performing the task 
with stimuli depicting their own compared to other's body-parts (hands, feet) and face-parts (eyes, 
mouths). This pattern of results suggests the presence of an implicit bodily self-processing in 8 
years old children.  
More important for the aim of this study, also ASD children showed a better performance with self 
than with others’ body and face-parts, suggesting that they are able to distinguish self and others’ 
stimuli and to take an advantage in processing self-compared to others’ stimuli. 
As described in Chapter 3, existing literature on adults concerning body perception suggests that 
our own body sub serves a special processing in contrast to others’ bodies, and that when our own 
body is compared with someone else’s body, self-stimuli show an advantage (Aranda et al., 2010; 
Daprati et al., 2007; Knoblich & Flach, 2003) and recruit specific underlying neural substrates 
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Hodzic et al., 2009; Myers & Sowden, 2008; Ferri et al., 2012). 
Similarly, as described in Chapter 2, recognition of one’s own face is consistently faster than the 
recognition of a stranger’s face (Tong & Nakayama, 1999) and a specific neural network is 
dedicated to self-face stimuli (Kircher et al., 2000; Sugiura et al., 2000, 2005, 2006).  
Behavioural studies in developmental age have demonstrated awareness in healthy infants of their 
physical appearance in the first years of life (Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal & Fisher, 1978;  
Bahrick, et al., 1996; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Rochat & Striano, 2002; Rochat, 2003). Rochat 
and Striano (2002) showed that at already 4-9 months of age, the infants are able to distinguish self 
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image from the other’s image suggesting early self-other differentiation. Bertenthal and Fisher 
(1978), by using five tasks performed in front of the mirror, documented the emergence of 
behaviors that indicate explicit awareness of the proper image by 14 to 18 months.  
Regarding previous studies conducted on children as old as participants of the present experiment, 
an advantage was found in recalling stimuli associated, in a previous presentation of the same 
stimuli, with self face image (Sui & Zhu, 2005). More recently Zamagni et al. (2011) demonstrated 
a self-advantage effect in children from 9 to 13 years old in a visual matching-to-sample task with 
self and others’ body-images.  
The presence of the self-advantage also in children with ASD showed that in ASD children the 
mechanism that allow to implicitly access to this representation are spared.  
As expected, our findings show a different influence in face-part-type processing, in ASD children. 
Indeed, autistic children were more accurate with stimuli representing mouth than eyes. However 
this effect was not modulated by ownership. The better performance of autistic children with mouth 
is in line with previous studies (Pelphrey et al., 2002; Joseph & Tanaka, 2003, Neumann Spezio et 
al., 2006; Bar-Haim et al., 2006). Behavioral abnormalities in eye-gaze perception and joint 
attention, as well as difficulties in understanding the mentalistic relevance of gaze, have already 
been documented in this disorder (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996, 1997, 2001; Charman et al., 1997; 
Dawson et al., 1998; Leekam, et al., 1998).  So, it is possible that the characteristic tendency of 
these children not to look into others’ eyes will result in them having difficulties with this type of 
stimulus. In this direction are also the results of Neumann et al. (2006) showing that people with 
autism fixated the location of the mouth in facial expressions more than did matched controls, even 
when the mouth was not shown and even in faces that were inverted. 
Finally, error rate was higher in ASD group compared to both TD1 and TD2 groups. This result is 
expected comparing ASD with TD2 children, because the two groups are different for mental age. 
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On the contrary this result was less expected comparing ASD with TD1 children because the two 
groups were matched for mental age. We hyphotize that this result is due to an impairment of ASD 
children in inhibiting the wrong response. Indeed, in our task it was required to choose the image 
matching the central one and to inhibit the wrong response. In this respect, previous studies have 
demonstrated that individuals with ASD are impaired in inhibiting prepotent responses due to the 
executive dysfunction (Hill, 2004; Happé et al., 2004). Moreover, Robinson and co-worker (2009) 
showed that the difficulties in inhibition of ASD children are independent of IQ, and relatively 
stable across the childhood years. However, in our study ASD children were not submitted to a 
specific battery of executive function so this hypothesis should be verified in future studies. 
In conclusion, our study explores an important aspect of bodily self-representation in ASD using a 
behavioural paradigm which allows to evaluate the implicit access to the representation of bodily 
self. The present results support the theory that there are different “levels” of self and that not all of 
these levels are impaired in autism. It is surprising how children with ASD, as well as children with 
typical development, when look at a picture representing their body, cannot avoid to recognize 
themselves. This recognition is implicit since never it was asked to explicitly recognize one’s own 
body. This preserved implicit access to self-body processing could be useful for a rehabilitative 
program to develop a more strength self-concept in autistic children.  
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CHAPTER 7. INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONAL BODY POSTURES ON IMPLICIT BODILY 
SELF-PROCESSING. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The ability to distinguish between bodily self and others and the advantage in processing self rather 
than others’ body-stimuli, (the so-called “self-advantage”) is well established in adult healthy 
subjects (Frassinetti, Maini, Romualdi, Galante, & Avanzi, 2008; Frassinetti et al., 2009, 2010; 
Jeannerod, 2003; Decety & Sommerville, 2003). The critical issues of the normal development of 
corporal self-recognition and its dysfunction remain poorly understood. As described in Chapter 4, 
several developmental studies have addressed self-recognition with a large body of research 
focusing on mirror self-recognition (Bertenthal & Fisher, 1978; Amsterdam, 1972). Mirror self-
recognition is, however, only one particular aspect of self-recognition. Observing ourselves in 
mirrors is not representative of the way in which we normally perceive and recognize our body 
(Knoblich, 2002). Despite the wealth of studies devoted to understanding self-recognition in 
mirrors, little is known about children’s ability to discern self from the other’s body. Considering 
the processing of self-information in autism, early studies (Kanner, 1943; Asperger, 1944) 
underlined that individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are completely self-focused or 
“egocentric in the extreme.” More recent data showed that this egocentrism may be evident in “a 
lack of distinguishing self from other” (Lee & Hobson, 2006, 1998; Mitchell & O’Keefe, 2008). 
Moreover, individuals with autism have also difficulties in self-referential cognitive processing. 
More specifically, these difficulties concern the self-conscious emotion recognition and experience 
and the self referential understanding of emotions (Hobson, Chidambi, Lee, & Meyer, 2006; Hill, 
Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Lombardo et al., 
2010; Silani et al., 2008). The presence of both egocentrism and impairments in self-referential 
cognitive processing in autism has led to formulate the “absent self” hypothesis (Frith, 2003; 
Happe´, 2003; Baron Cohen, 2005; Frith & de Vignemont, 2005; Hobson et al., 2006). The absent-
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self hypothesis proposes a lack of specific higher-order self-awareness in autism that causes deficit 
in the social life. The importance of the body as a channel for socialization and for the 
communication of emotions (emotional body language [EBL]) is well known. Moreover, bodily 
emotions enhance the activity of brain areas (EBA and FBA) involved in processing bodies and 
body parts (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003; Gre`zes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007). Although an 
impairment of emotion processing is one of the features of autism, the level at which alterations 
occur is an open question. An impairment of facial emotional processing in individuals with autism 
has been shown in various experimental tasks, such as in matching or in labeling emotions (Celani, 
Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & 
Stirling, 1989). However, in other studies, no differences were found between children with autism 
and controls in discriminating between different emotional expressions (Grossman, Klin, Carter, & 
Volkmar, 2000; Robel et al., 2004; Loveland et al., 1997). Few studies have investigated the 
perception of emotional signals expressed by the whole body in ASD. Using behavioral measures 
and functional MRI (fMRI), Hadjikhani et al., (2009) compared the perception of bodily expressed 
emotions in adult individuals with ASD and in controls. They found in ASD an abnormality in the 
network of brain areas that are normally engaged in the perception of bodily expressed emotions. 
Indeed, brain activation patterns in individuals with ASD do not show evidence of differentiation 
between bodily expressions of fear and bodies engaged in neutral actions. These findings are in line 
with behavioral data (Moore, Hobson, & Lee, 1997; Hubert et al., 2007). Moore et al. (1997) found 
that children with autism were as able as nonautistic children in recognizing point-light displays of 
walking people, but that they were impaired in spontaneously commenting on the emotional and 
subjective states depicted. Similarly, Hubert and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that adults with 
autism performed significantly worse than controls in recognizing emotions from point-light 
displays even though they performed as well as control participants in recognizing simple actions 
and objects manipulations. The authors interpreted their results as evidence that emotional 
perception difficulties are not restricted to faces but also affect the perception of body expression of 
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emotion. Here, we formulate the hypothesis that the bodily self is a low-level function compared to 
the higher-order self-awareness, essential to social cognition, and that the bodily self is spared even 
if the higher-order self-awareness is impaired in high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HF-
ASD) children. We additionally hypothesized that bodily self can be modulated by postures 
associated with different emotions. Indeed, one’s own way of expressing emotions, through body 
posture, should add information about the bodily self. We predicted that in TD children, emotional 
body postures will modulate the bodily self-recognition when subjects self-generate postures 
associated with different emotions (the self as expressed through emotional behaviors), but not 
when bodily emotions’ expression is merely reproduced from another person’s posture. As far as 
ASD children, at least two hypotheses can be put forward. The first one is that, the implicit 
processing of emotional body postures is different in ASD and in TD children. If this is the case, the 
influence of emotional body postures on bodily self processing is different in the two groups. 
Alternatively, if the implicit processing of emotional body postures is similar in ASD and in TD 
children, one might expect similar modulation of emotional body postures on bodily self-processing 
in the two groups. To test these hypotheses we contrasted, in two separate experiments, the effects 
of postures associated with emotions in bodily self-recognition in 16 HF-ASD children with those 
of 16 typically developing (TD) age- and IQ-matched children, in a visual matching- to-sample 
task. In Experiment 1, subjects were photographed while expressing endogenously (self-generated) 
emotional body postures, whereas in Experiment 2 subjects did so exogenously (i.e., imitated upon 
request). Emotions were positive (happiness), negative (fear), or neutral. In each experiment, 
subjects were shown stimuli depicting their own body, or other people’s bodies to test whether the 
advantage observed in adults with self over others’ bodies is also present in ASD and TD children 
populations, as well as how it is modulated by emotional body postures. 
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7.2 Materials and methods 
Participants 
Two experimental groups participated in this study. The first group included 16 high-functioning 
children with autism syndrome, selected from a center for children with ASD (Reggio Emilia, 
Italy). They will hereby be designated as the group of individuals with ASD. They were diagnosed 
according to the DSM–IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for autism and to the 
ADOS G scale (Lord et al., 2000), given by a trained clinical psychologist. None of them had 
known associated medical disorders at the time of testing and visual examination was found to be 
normal. ASD participants were matched to a control group of 16 typically developing individuals 
(TD). The two groups did not differ with respect to age (average age ASD = 11 years, SD = 2 years; 
TD = 11 years, SD = 2; p = .77) and IQ (average full scale ASD = 91, SD = 15.3; TD = 98, SD = 
14.6; p = .16). Subjects’ parents gave informed consent to their children’s participation in the study, 
which was approved by the local ethics committee. All procedures were in agreement with the 1975 
Helsinki Declaration. 
 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were color pictures extracted from videos of participants’ body, captured using a video 
camera. Subjects, wearing a black T shirt and a pair of black trousers, were videotaped in a frontal 
position in an uniformly illuminated room while standing against a white background. The extracted 
pictures were successively edited using Adobe Photoshop CS3 to cut out the head, to equalize body 
size across participants, and to center the stimulus on the background. 
Recording of bodily emotions. Participants were videotaped in two different conditions: 
expressing self-generated emotional postures and imitating stereotyped postures selected from a 
pilot study (see below).  
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In Experiment 1 (self-generated postures) children were videotaped while expressing the three 
target emotions of happiness, fear,  and neutral through body postures. They were free to interpret 
and express the emotions as they felt, with only minimal guidance as to the sorts of situations in 
which children might experience those emotions (i.e., for happiness it was suggested to the children 
that they might want to think about winning a game or obtaining a good rating at school). One 
expression for each of the three selfexpressed emotions was recorded, for a total of three pictures 
for each subject. These pictures were matched, for each emotion, with two other children’s pictures. 
Other children were shown self body pictures and were videotaped while they were imitating the 
selfexpressed emotional body postures. Thus, in this experiment, all emotions were expressed in the 
way that corresponded to the way in which the experimental subject expresses the emotions and, 
additionally, self and others’ pictures were visually similar (see Fig. 12 a). 
In Experiment 2 (imitated postures) children were videotaped while imitating the three body 
postures selected in the pilot study and shown by an experimenter serving as an actor (see Fig. 12 
c). As a consequence, the emotions were expressed in a way that did not correspond to that in which 
the experimental subject personally expresses the emotions.  
For both experiments, in each trial three stimuli representing the same emotion were simultaneously 
presented, horizontally aligned along the horizontal meridian of the computer screen, until the 
subject’s response was obtained. Note that the three stimuli presented in each trial were visually 
similar, since in Experiment 1 other people imitated the “self” postures (see Fig. 12 b) and in 
Experiment 2 subjects (self and others) imitated postures selected in the pilot study (see Figure 12 
d). The central stimulus was presented in a black frame and corresponded to the target stimulus. In 
half of the trials, at least one of the stimuli represented subject’s own body (self condition), whereas 
in the other half, stimuli represented other children’s body (other condition). Stimuli that served as 
“own body” for one participant were used as “others’ body” for a different participant. The same 
“other body” was used for each emotional expression. 
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Figure 12: a) Stimuli for Experiment 1 (endogenously generated emotional body postures). 1) Happiness; 2) Neutral; 3) 
Fear. b) An example of a single trial for Experiment 1. Participants were required to decide which of the two lateral 
images (right or left) matched the central sample stimulus. c) Stimuli for Experiment 2 (exogenously generated 
emotional body postures). 1) Happiness; 2) Neutral; 3) Fear. d) An example of a single trial for Experiment 2. 
Participants were required to decide which of the two lateral images (the right or the left one) matched the central 
sample stimulus. 
 
Procedure 
Subjects sat in front of the PC screen, at a distance of about 30 cm. Subjects were asked: “Which of 
the two lateral body images (the right or the left one) matched the central sample stimulus?” In the 
instructions it was not specified whether the match should be made in terms of the body portrayed 
or of the body expression. In this respect, it is important to note that no explicit recognition of the 
two variables (ownership and emotions) was required. Subjects were instructed to press a 
previously assigned response key to respond. Key-press response times (RTs) and response 
accuracy were recorded. Stimulus presentation and randomization in a block were controlled using 
E-prime V1.1 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) running on a PC. Each 
experiment consisted of 24 trials: 12 trials contained the subject’s own body (in 6 trials the own 
body was the target picture and in 6 trials the own body was the right or left stimulus) and 12 trials 
60 
 
contained two others’ bodies (A and B, in 6 trials the body “A” was the target and in 6 trials the 
body “B” was the target). Owner and Emotion variables were randomized between trials. All 
participants performed both experiments in one single session, with 5 practice trials before running 
the first experiment. Experiments were submitted in counterbalanced order across subjects. 
 
7.3 Pilot Study 
Healthy children (average age = 11 years, range 9–12 years), were videotaped while expressing 
with their body one of four target emotions of happiness, anger, fear, and neutral. To facilitate self-
generated emotional postures, children were told short stories with a corresponding emotional 
content. A total of 16 pictures representing four types of postures for each emotion, extracted from 
videos and edited as described above, were selected and then shown to a different group of 13 
children (average age = 11 years, range 9–14 years). Children categorized each picture into one of 
the same four target emotion categories and attributed a score corresponding to the emotional 
intensity of each image (1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high). When subjects did not correctly recognize 
emotional postures, the score was 0. The posture for each emotion with highest scores was selected 
for Experiment 2. Since “anger”, independently from the type of posture, obtained the lowest score, 
being inconsistently recognized, it was discarded and the study focused the three emotions that were 
consistently recognized correctly (neutral, happiness, and fear). 
 
7.4 Results 
Separate ANOVAs on RTs and on the percentage of correct responses (accuracy) were conducted 
for each experiment, with group (ASD and TD) as between-participants variable and emotion 
(neutral, happiness, and fear) and owner (self and other) as within participants variables. The 
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Newman–Keuls test was used for all post hoc comparisons. The effect size (eta square = η2) was 
reported for all the significant effects. 
 
Experiment 1 
Analysis conducted on the RTs showed a significant main effect of group [F(1, 30) = 5.43, p = .03, 
η2= 0.15], because TD controls were faster than ASD children (2383 ms vs. 3397 ms). The variable 
owner was significant [F(1, 30) = 12.68, p = .001, η2= 0.30], subjects being faster in processing self 
rather than others’ stimuli (2600 ms vs. 3180 ms). The interaction emotion X owner was significant 
[F(2, 60) = 6.72, p = .001, η2= 0.30]. Post hoc comparisons showed that self-advantage was evident 
with stimuli representing neutral (2511 vs. 3263, p = .001), and happy (2503 vs. 3479, p = .0002) 
bodily expression, but not with stimuli representing fearful body postures (2787 vs. 2797, p = .96). 
Moreover, with other’s body, subjects were faster with stimuli representing fear compared to 
neutral and happiness ( p = .02 and p = .001, respectively). With self body, subjects’ performance 
was not statistically different among emotional expressions. This pattern of results was similar in 
patients and in healthy subjects since the three-way interaction was not significant ( p=.13) (see 
Figure 2a–b).  
A similar ANOVA conducted on the mean of correct responses showed a significant effect of the 
variable owner [F(1, 30) = 14.6, p = .001, η2 = 0.33], subjects being more accurate with stimuli 
representing self (97%) than other’s body (92%). The variable group (ADS = 95% and TD = 95%) 
and the variable emotion (N = 95%, H = 94% and F = 95%) and their interactions were not 
significant. 
Experiment 2 
In the ANOVA conducted on mean response times with group as between-subjects variable and 
emotion and owner as within subject variables, only the variable owner was significant [F(1, 30) = 
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5.70, p = .02, η2= 0.16], subjects being faster in processing self rather than others’ stimuli (3230 ms 
vs. 3488 ms). The variables group, emotion and their interactions were not significant (see Fig. 
13c–d).  
When the similar ANOVA was conducted on the mean of correct responses variables group (ASD = 
96%, TD = 98%), emotion (N = 97%, H = 97% and F = 95%) and owner (self = 97%, other = 96%) 
and their interactions were not significant.  
 
Figure 13: Mean reaction times of typically developing (a– c) and ASD (autism spectrum disorder) children (b– d) in 
the visual-matching task, in Experiment 1 (a– b, endogenously generated emotional body postures) and in Experiment 2 
(c– d, exogenously generated emotional body postures). The results are displayed as a function of ownership (self, 
other) and emotions (neutral, happiness, and fear). Bars represent SEM (standard error mean) intersubjects. Differences 
significant at p = .05 are starred. 
 
The results of the second experiment showed that adding information derived from the participant’s 
exogenous, not self-generated, bodily emotions did not modulate the self-body processing.  
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Even if the analysis across both experiments1
3
 revealed that this modulation was present in both 
experiments, it was stronger in the first one, when body postures were endogenously generated. The 
different results between the Experiments 1 and 2 should be due to a reduced variability of postures 
across individuals with exogenously generated postures (Experiment 2) compared to endogenously 
generated postures (Experiment 1). To exclude this possibility an ANOVA was conducted on 
standard deviation values with group as between subjects variable and experiment (Experiment 1 
and 2), owner (self, other), and emotion (neutral, happiness, and fear) as within-subject variables. 
Only the variable group was significant [F(1, 30) = 10.17, p = .003, η2= 0.25]; the variability was 
overall larger in ASD than TD children (1522 ms vs. 835 ms), with no difference among emotional 
postures [F(2, 60) = 0.41, p = .66]. 
 
7.5 Discussion 
Using a visual-matching task, in which explicit recognition of the corporeal self was not necessary 
we found a bodily “self-advantage” in ASD, as well as in TD children, since both groups were 
faster with self than other stimuli. Therefore, the bodily self-advantage, described in adult healthy 
subjects (Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009 and 2010), was found also in 9–13-year-old children with 
typical and atypical development. The presence of this self-recognition during the developmental 
age is in line with the literature of developmental psychology (see Rochart, 2003 for the five levels 
of self-awareness). It is known that by the middle of the second year, young children show a self-
recognition assessed by mirror recognition, personal pronoun use, and pretend play (Bertenthal & 
Fisher, 1978; Lewis & Ramsey, 2004). Interestingly, the bodily self-advantage was present also in 
ASD children. A part of the prior research showed that individuals with autism do not benefit from 
                                                             
3 To compare the performance in the two experiments, a further Anova was conducted on RTs with group as between-participants variable and 
experiment (Experiment 1 and 2), emotion, and owner as within-participants variables. The variable experiment was significant [F(1, 30) = 7.18, p = 
.01, η2= 0.19], since participants were faster in the first than in the second experiment (2890 ms vs. 3359 ms). Interestingly, the variable owner [F(1, 
30) = 4.20, p = .0001 η2= 0.40] and its interaction with the variable emotion [F(2, 60) = 6.20, p = .004 η2= 0.25] were significant, showing a self 
advantage with stimuli representing neutral (2843 vs. 3361, p = .0001), and happy (2831 vs. 3522, p = .0001) bodily expression, but not with stimuli 
representing fearful body postures (3072 vs. 3119, p = .73). 
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processing information in self-relevant ways. Behavioral studies showed a reduced self-reference 
effect in autism (Lombardo et al., 2007; Henderson et al., 2009). In addition, neuroimaging studies 
suggest that the neural systems involved in self-representation are atypically in autism. In this 
respect, Lombardo and colleagues (2010) conducted a functional MRI (fMRI) study where 
participants (ASD and neurotypical adults) were scanned while reflecting on the self or a familiar 
nonclose other (the British Queen) in either a mentalistic or a physical way. They found atypical 
responses in subjects with ASD in the critical areas involved in coding for self-information. 
Moreover, a reduced functional connectivity between areas involved in higher-level conceptual self-
representation and areas involved in lower-level embodied representation was found. However, the 
above-mentioned researches used complex tasks such as questions on mentalizing judgments of the 
self and others. In the present study, participants performed a variant of a visual matching-to-sample 
task that has been previously shown to indirectly assess the proper functioning of corporeal self 
processing in Chapter 6. The bodily self investigated here is a low level of self-awareness that could 
be preserved in autism. Indeed, “there is not a single sense of self or a self-specific neural system” 
(see Tsakiris, 2010, for a review). Rather, the self is a complex multidimensional construct. Bodily 
self represents only one component of the self. It is possible that in autism some components of the 
self can be impaired while others can be spared. Indeed, not all studies showed an impairment in 
self-processing in ASD. For example, Williams and Happe´ (2009) found that participants with 
ASD recalled their own actions better than others’ actions showing the so called “self-reference 
effect.” Moreover, the severity of the impairment in self-body processing could be related with the 
social impairment in autism, similar to what found for other aspects of the self (Lombardo et al., 
2010). However, the current data cannot by themselves support this hypothesis.  
The second result of the present study is that the self-advantage is modulated by emotional body 
postures. This modulation is stronger when body postures are endogenously, rather than 
exogenously, generated. This social modulation of the self was comparably present in autistic and 
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control children. The self-advantage was indeed found in both groups with expressions of happy 
and neutral, but not fearful body postures. The presence of self-advantage with neutral stimuli 
indicates that postures expressing emotions may influence or modulate, without being a “necessary 
factor” for, bodily self recognition. The lack of self-advantage with bodily fearful expression is 
compatible with the idea that humans comparably elaborate self and others’ bodily signals of fear. 
In addition, there was a selective advantage for others’ fearful stimuli (others’ fear sensitivity) over 
others’ happy and neutral stimuli, with no difference among self emotional stimuli. For the social 
evolution of species, the recognition of the signs of fear in others is very important and might 
temporarily eliminate (or override) self– other distinctions. Indeed, others’ fearful body postures 
signal a threat and at the same time specify the action to be undertaken by the individuals fearing 
for their safety, as suggested also by studies on monkeys (de Gelder & Partan, 2009). Therefore, 
considering that recognize the fear expressions of other people allow us to warn against potential 
threats, it is of considerable interest that functional imaging research has found increased activity in 
the amygdala for tasks in which participants view fearful expressions, with no amygdala activation 
for happy expressions (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 
1998; Hadjikhani et al., 2009; de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004). 
Interestingly, the amygdala plays a central role in linking fear signals with appropriate defensive 
and attentional responses (Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004).  
The most interesting result of this study is that even if ASD were overall slower than TD children in 
performing the matching task, there was no qualitative difference between ASD and TD children 
with respect to this explored function. Indeed, bod –postures modulate the self/others’ distinction in 
ASD as in TD children. These findings clearly support the hypothesis that bodily self/other 
recognition and its modulations by emotional body postures are low-level functions that, possibly 
owing to their crucial role for the survival of social species, may be preserved in subjects with 
autism spectrum disorders. 
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This result is only apparently in contrast with previous studies on the perception of bodily emotions 
in autism (Hadjikhani et al., 2009; Hubert et al., 2007). Indeed, in the study of Hubert and 
colleagues (2007), the tasks were different from the present one. Moreover, Hadjikhani and 
colleagues (2009) showed a different pattern of cortical and subcortical activation in ASD and TD 
children. It is possible that the similar modulation of emotional body postures that we found in ASD 
and TD children, involves partially different neural networks in the two populations. Future studies 
will clarify the neural bases of the emotional modulation of the self and others’ body in subjects 
with typical and atypical development. 
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CHAPTER 8. THE LOSS OF IMPLICIT SELF-BODY RECOGNITION IN PARKINSON 
DISEASE. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a degenerative and progressive disease of the central nervous system 
(CNS), which is characterized by the death of neurons in the substantia nigra, with consequent 
diminution of dopamine, leading to typical motor alterations (Agid, 1991) such as tremor, rigidity, 
slowness of voluntary movements and walking and posture balance alterations (Conley, 1999). 
Recently, Gamarra and coworkers (2009) demonstrated that such motor impairments and the 
distortion to the body structure induce alterations of the body image and self-concept in PD patients. 
Body image consists of the picture formed by the mental images or representations of the body. In 
Gamarra et al.’s study, body image perception and self-concept in PD patients were evaluated 
respectively through “The My Body Image Test” and “The Factorial Self-Concept Scale”. PD 
patients presented worse perception of their body image and a reduced self-concept in relation to 
controls.  Alterations of body image in PD patients were also described by other authors.  
Sandyk (1997) described three PD patients who exhibited macrosomatognosia of one or both upper 
limbs. Macrosomatognosia refers to a disorder of the body image in which the patient perceives part 
of his body (or his entire body) as disproportionally large (Fredericks, 1963; 1969). 
Macrosomatognosia has been associated with lesions in the parietal lobe, particularly the right 
parietal lobe, which integrates perceptual-sensorimotor functions concerned with body image. It has 
been observed most commonly in patients with paroxysmal cerebral disorders such as epilepsy and 
migraine. In the three PD patients described by Sandyk (1997) the spontaneous drawing of the 
figure of a man demonstrated disproportionately large arms. Furthermore, it was observed that the 
arm affected by tremor or, in the case of bilateral tremor, the arm showing the most severe tremor, 
showed the greatest abnormality. This association implies that dopaminergic mechanisms influence 
neuronal systems in the right parietal lobe that constructs one’s body image. 
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More recently, it was found that the right hemisphere is specifically involved in recognition of 
images depicting one’s own rather than other peoples’ bodies.  This evidence comes from studies 
conducted on brain-damaged patients. In a visual matching task, when healthy subjects were 
required to decide which of two vertically aligned images depicting their own body or face parts or 
other people’s body or face parts, matched the central target, they were facilitated when one of the 
stimuli belonged to their own body or face compared to when they belonged to someone else 
(Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009, 2010). This effect, called ‘self-advantage’, was also found in patients 
with a lesion of the left hemisphere, but not in patients with a lesion of the right hemisphere 
(Frassinetti et al., 2008). Moreover, some right-brain-damaged patients were impaired in processing 
self-related body parts but not self-related face parts, thus providing initial evidence of a modular 
representation of the corporeal self. 
 
Interestingly, in healthy subjects the self-advantage effect emerges only when participants are 
implicitly required to recognize their own body. By contrast, the self-advantage does not emerge 
when an explicit recognition of one’s own body is required (Frassinetti et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 
2011). These data suggest that implicit and explicit self-body recognition rely upon different 
mechanisms. For implicit self-body recognition, behavioral and neuroimaging data have suggested 
that this facilitation in discriminating self versus other people’s body parts is based mainly on the 
sensorimotor representation of one’s own body (Frassinetti et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 2011; Ferri et 
al., 2012). The explicit self-body recognition is based on different cognitive processes, most likely 
involving visual information, memory and attention capacities (see Frassinetti et al., 2011). 
 
Here we tested the implicit and explicit self-body and face parts recognition in PD patients. 
Patients with Parkinson disease and healthy controls were submitted to two visual tasks in two 
separate experiments. In both the experiments, subjects were shown stimuli depicting their own or 
other people’s body-parts (hand, foot) and face-parts (eyes, mouth). In the first experiment, subjects 
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were required to decide which of two vertically aligned images (the upper or the lower one) 
matched the central target stimulus. In this experiment participants were never explicitly asked to 
identify one’s own body or face parts, so we used this experiment as an implicit measure of self-
body and self-face  recognition. In the second experiment participants were required to decide 
whether the upper or the lower image corresponded to their own body or face part. In this 
experiment we used an explicit self/other discrimination task. 
 
If motor and proprioceptive deficits affect the sensorimotor representation of one’s own body, PD 
patients should be impaired in the implicit but not in the explicit bodily self-recognition. Since the 
sensory-motor deficit in PD patients affect both face and body (Marsili et al., 2014) , this 
impairment in implicit recognition should regard self-face as well as self-body-parts.  
 
8.2 Method  
Participants 
Twenty participants with no history of previous neurological or psychiatric disease (mean age = 
69.2 years; st.dev. ±6.9) and twelve patients with Parkinson Disease (PD) (mean age = 70.6 years; 
st. dev. ±8.9), gave their informed consent to participate in the study, which was approved by the 
local ethics committee. All procedures were in agreement with the 2008 Helsinki Declaration. 
Patients were recruited consecutively at the Fondazione Salvatore Maugeri (Clinica del Lavoro e 
della Riabilitazione, IRCCS – Istituto Scientifico of Castel Goffredo, Mantova, Italy) and were 
selected according to DSM-IV criteria for the Diagnosis of Parkinson’s Disease. All the patients 
were in stage I and II of the modified Hoehn and Yahr staging scale (1967). Exclusion criteria were 
as follows: (1) vascular, pharmacological or atypical Parkinsonism; (2) presence of other 
neurological or psychiatric diseases nonrelated to PD; (3) abusive use of alcohol or illicit drugs; (4) 
any serious clinical disease able of produce functional impairment (5) Mini-Mental Score 
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Examination (MMSE) lower than 24 points. The control group met the same inclusion and 
exclusion criteria.  
 
Stimuli  
The experimental stimuli consisted of grey-scale pictures of participant’s and other people’s body- 
(hand and foot) and face-parts (eyes and mouth) (Fig. 14). Flash photographs were taken with a 
digital camera, perpendicular to each part of the body and face, which were always photographed in 
the same position while standing against a uniform white background. Participant’s face and body 
parts were photographed in a session prior to the experiments (1 week before). This session took 
place in a controlled environment with constant artificial light and a fixed distance between the 
camera lens and the body/face-parts (40 cm). 
The pictures were equalized for visual properties such as brightness and contrast and digitally edited 
(Adobe Photoshop) for extracting the background, equalizing the size across participants, isolating 
the relevant portion of the body-part and centering it on a uniform white background. 
Other people’s body-face parts were selected from a database as the best match for size, skin color, 
age, and gender, in comparison with each participant’s face and body parts.  
 
 
Figure 14:  Examples of the experimental stimuli. For each category (body-parts and face-parts), two stimuli (hand/foot 
and mouth/eyes) were presented. 
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Procedure 
 
In the implicit experiment  three stimuli of the same category (hands, feet, eyes or mouths) were 
aligned along the vertical meridian of the computer screen. The central stimulus, which 
corresponded to the target stimulus, was presented within a black frame (see Fig. 15a). Stimuli 
presented in each trial were matched for visual similarity. Participants sat in front of the PC screen, 
at a distance of about 30 cm. They were required to decide whether the upper or the lower stimulus 
matched the target stimulus by pressing an upper or a lower (vertically aligned and previously 
assigned) response key, with their right index finger. Participants were instructed to respond as 
accurately as possible. The trial was timed-out as soon as participants responded. RTs and response 
accuracy were recorded. The implicit experiment  consisted of 96 trials divided into two blocks, one 
with body-parts (48 trials) and one with face-parts (48 trials).  
In the explicit experiment  two stimuli of the same category (hands, feet, eyes or mouths), were 
simultaneously presented in each trial. The stimuli were the same as in implicit experiment, except 
that there was no target stimulus within the central frame. As in the implicit experiment, the stimuli 
were aligned along the vertical meridian of the computer screen (see Fig. 15b). Participants were 
required to decide whether the upper or the lower image corresponded to their own body or face 
part by pressing an upper or a lower (vertically aligned and previously assigned) response key, with 
their right index finger. If none of the stimuli corresponded to their own body or face part, they had 
to press a central response key. Participants were instructed to respond as accurately as possible. 
The trial was timed-out as soon as participants responded. RTs and response accuracy were 
recorded. The explicit experiment  consisted of 32 trials divided into two blocks, one with body 
parts (16 trials) and one with face parts (16 trials). 
Stimulus presentation and randomization in a block were controlled using E-prime V1.1 software 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) running on a PC.  
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Each block of the two experiments were constituted by half self trials (each presenting at least one 
picture of participant’s own body or face parts), and half others’ trials (each presenting only pictures 
of three other people’s body or face parts). All participants performed the Experiments in one single 
session, with 12 practice trials before each block. 
The implicit experiment  was always conducted before the explicit experiment. The order of the 
blocks in each experiment was randomized between subjects.  
 
 
Figure 15  Examples of a single trials. (a) Implicit task: participants were requiredto decide which of the two images 
(the upper or the lower one) matched the central stimulus target. (b) Explicit task: participants were required to judge 
whether and which image, between the upper or lower, corresponded to their own face or body-parts. 
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8.3 Results  
The mean percentage of correct responses (accuracy) was analyse. First, to characterize the 
performance of the control group, an ANOVA was conducted with Stimulus (body or face parts) 
and Ownership (self and other’s stimuli) as within-subject variables. Pairwise comparisons were 
conducted with the ‘‘Tukey honest for equal N’’ test when necessary. 
Then, a further ANOVA was performed to compare PD patients’ performance with age-matched 
controls, with Group (controls and patients) as between-subject variable and Stimulus and 
Ownership as within-subject variables. In this case, pairwise comparisons were conducted with the 
‘‘Tukey honest for unequal N’’ test. 
The same ANOVAs were separately conducted for the Implicit and the Explicit tasks. 
 
 Results of the Implicit Task 
 
Healthy subjects 
A significant effect of the variable Ownership [F(1.19)=5.76, p<0.02; η2p =0.23] was found, since 
controls performed better with their own rather than with other people’s stimuli (97% vs. 95%, P < 
.03), showing the so-called self-advantage effect. The variable Stimulus ( p=0.17) and the 
interaction between Stimulus x Ownership (p=0.27) were not significant. 
 
Comparison between controls and patients’ performance 
When the performance of the two groups was compared, the variable Group [F(1.30)=10.74, 
p<0.003; η2p = 0.26] was significant: control subjects (96%) were more accurate than patients 
(90%). The interaction between Group X Ownership was also  significant [F(1.30)=11.29, p<0.002; 
η2p = 0.28]. Post hoc analysis revealed that patients with PD performed substantially worse with 
their own (89%) than with others’ body stimuli (92%, p< .03), showing a self-disadvantage effect. 
Moreover, with self-stimuli PD patients were less accurate compared with controls (89% vs 97%, 
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p<.03) whereas with others’ stimuli no significant differences were found between the two groups 
(92 vs 95% p=.34) (see Fig. 16) 
 
 
Figure 16: Implicit Task : Mean percentage of correct responses of self and other people’s stimuli in the two groups (PD 
= Parkinson’s disease patients; C = Controls). Bars represent S.E.M. (standard error mean) inter-subjects. 
 
 
Results of Explicit Task 
 
Healthy subjects 
Statistical analysis, conducted on the accuracy,  didn’t showed significant effects. Crucially for the 
aim of the present study, no differences were found between self and others’ stimuli (self=69% vs 
other=64%; p=0.26). 
 
Comparison between controls and patients 
When the performance of the two groups was compared no significant effects were found. More 
precisely, no difference was found between patients’ and controls’ accuracy (57% vs 67, p=.12) and 
between self and others’ stimuli (63% vs 62%, p=.86). The interaction between the two variables 
was also not significant (p=.14) (see fig. 17 for mean values) 
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Figure 17: Implicit Task : Mean percentage of correct responses of self and otherpeople’s stimuli  in the two groups (PD 
= Parkinson’s disease patients; C = Controls). Bars represent S.E.M. (standard error mean) inter-subjects. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
The most interesting result of the present study is that PD patients in the implicit task not only did 
not show the self-advantage effect, but also showed a self-disadvantage effect: they were less 
accurate with self than with others’ stimuli. Moreover with self-stimuli, PD patients’ performance 
was worse than controls’ performance, whereas this difference was not significant with stimuli 
depicting others’ parts. This demonstrates that PD patients are not generally impaired in performing 
the task, rather they are specifically impaired in processing self-related stimuli. 
 
It is important to note that this deficit is confined to the implicit task and is not extended to the 
explicit task. Indeed no differences were found between PD patients and controls in the explicit 
recognition of both self and others’ stimuli. This finding is even more interesting when considered 
in the context of a second finding of the present study—namely the fact that for all participants 
solving the explicit task proved more difficult, in terms of lower accuracy, than the implicit task. 
This result confirms that implicit self recognition is selectively impaired in PD patients. 
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Behavioral and neuroimaging data (Frassinetti etal., 2011; Ferri et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 2012) 
suggest that the implicit body self-advantage relies upon the integration of visual information with 
other modalities, having the sensorimotor body representation as the crucial role. Thus, the self-
disadvantage effect in PD patients can be the result of the rigidity and the difficulty of locomotion 
experienced with the progression of the disease. Somatosensory and motor problems could have 
induced alterations in these patients of their own body somatosensory representation. Thus, when 
the displayed hand is their own hand, patients failed to match with the representation of their own 
hand, with consequently greater amount of errors in this condition compared to when the displayed 
hand is another person’s hand. The observation that the self-disadvantage effect was found both for 
self-body parts and face-parts corroborates the hypothesis of a deficit of sensory-motor 
representation. Indeed motor and somatosensory problems characterized not only patients’ bodies 
but also patients’ faces. Indeed a decreased mobility in the muscles of the face and a loss of facial 
expression (hypomimia) are the major symptoms of this disorder. 
 
A further explanation of the self-disadvantage effect could be alterations of the central nervous 
system in PD patients.  Subcortical dopaminergic pathways may influence cortical neuronal systems 
in the right hemisphere. In PD, besides the dopaminergic damage in substantia nigra, pathological 
and neurochemical changes have been observed in cortical and subcortical structures, including the 
serotonergic raphe nuclei, the noradrenergic locus coeruleus and the cholinergic nucleus basalis of 
Meynert (Halliday et al., 1990). These subcortical neurotransmitter systems send diffuse projections 
to the neocortex and chronic deafferentation from these subcortical systems results in diminished 
cortical metabolic activity, especially in the posterior cerebral regions. The disconnection of various 
subcortical regions from the neocortex and the subsequent effect on thalamocortical and 
corticocortical connections contributes to the development of various cognitive deficits observed in 
these patients, including disorders of body representation (Eberling et al., 1994). Since 
neuropsychological studies have demonstrated a critical role of the right hemisphere in implicit self-
77 
 
body recognition (Frassinetti et al, 2008; 2009; 2010), a functional impairment of the right 
hemisphere in PD patients could explain their deficit in implicit self-body processing. 
 
Regarding healthy subjects, the present study confirms and extends previous findings. The 
dissociation between the self-advantage effect in the implicit but not in the explicit task is here for 
the first time extended to face stimuli and to older people.  Indeed, previous studies (Frassinetti et 
al., 2011; Ferri et al., 2011) were conducted on young people (range 20-55 years old), using only 
pictures representing body and not face parts. 
 
In conclusion, these findings provide initial neuropsychological evidence that self-processing can be 
altered in Parkinson disease.  
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CHAPTER 9. INTERPERSONAL SPACE REGULATION IN AUTISM SPECTRUM 
DISORDERS. 
 
9.1 Introduction 
People automatically and reliably regulate their interpersonal space to obtain a comfortable 
distance of interaction (Hall, 1966). As described in Chapter 5, this behavior is part of the 
interpersonal self and is absent only when we are alone, but is sufficient that in the same place are 
present two or more people that we cannot avoid to regulate our spatial position taking into account 
that of other. Interpersonal distance can be described as a bubble of space surrounding a person 
(Hall, 1966), into which intrusion by others causes discomfort. 
A number of studies have shown that the size of the personal space varies depending on social 
context. A person who is placed in a potentially threatening context will have an expanded personal 
pace; a person in friendly company will have a reduced personal space (Dosey et al. 1969; Graziano 
et al. 2006; Felipe et al. 1966). Moreover, the size of interpersonal space can change as a function of 
different factors, including gender (Lomranz et al. 1975), age (Aiello, 1987), infant–caregiver 
attachment (Cassidy et al. 1994; Bar-Haim et al. 2002) and familiarity between interacting parties 
(Watson, 1970; Cristani et al. 2012). Studies have also documented that psychiatric (Deus et al. 
2006), neurological (Kennedy et al. 2009) and developmental disorders (Vranic, 2003) can interfere 
with the regulation of personal space.  
Recently, Kennedy and coworkers (Kennedy et al. 2009) described the regulation of 
interpersonal distance in a patient (SM) with bilateral amygdala damage. In their experiment, the 
authors asked SM to indicate the position at which she felt most comfortable as an experimenter 
approached her, or she approached the experimenter. SM showed a substantially reduced personal 
space compared to comparison subjects. A questionnaire, in which the patient rated her level of 
comfort/discomfort standing to different distances from the experimenter, put in evidence that SM 
was perfectly comfortable also at a nose-to-nose distance with the experimenter. These study 
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showed that bilateral damage to the amygdala results in no detectable personal space boundary and 
an abnormally small interpersonal distance preference, thereby suggesting that this brain structure is 
part of the neural substrate regulating the distance between individuals. This hypothesis was 
confirmed, in the same study (Kennedy et al., 2009) by fMRI data showing a greater activation of 
the amygdala when participants knew that an experimenter was maintaining a close distance to 
them, compared to when they knew that an experimenter was maintaining a far distance. This 
conclusion is consistent with the results of non-human primate studies, revealing that monkeys with 
bilateral amygdalar damage preferred to stay in closer proximity to other monkeys or people 
compared to monkeys without lesion (Kluver et al. 1938; Emery et al. 2001; Mason et al. 2006). 
Because personal space represents the space of interaction and communication with others, it 
is critical to study this space in subjects with everyday difficulties in social and emotional behavior, 
such as patients with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder 
characterized by marked and enduring deficits of interpersonal interaction, including behavioral 
avoidance and unresponsiveness (Richer et al. 1976; Wing et al. 1979; Fein et al. 1986; Hobson, 
1993, Klin et al. 2002), and failure to spontaneously interact with people (Happè et al. 1996; 
Volkmar et al. 2000). Moreover, it has been proposed that dysfunction of the amygdala may be 
responsible, at least in part, for the impairment of social and emotional functioning that is a core 
feature of autism (Bachevalier, 1994; Baron-Cohen et al. 1999; Howard et al. 2000; Adolphs et al. 
2001). However, relatively little is known about the way in which autistic individuals regulate the 
physical distance from other people during social interactions. Although anecdotal observations and 
some meager evidence (Kennedy et al. 2010) suggest that the ability to reliably regulate one’s 
distance from other people may be impaired in ASD, interpersonal distance has never been directly 
measured in individuals with autism in a laboratory test. 
In the present study, our primary aim was to provide a direct measure of the personal space of 
children with typical development (TD) and children with an impairment in social approach, such 
as autism (ASD). The second aim was to investigate the modulation of personal space by a brief 
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social interaction with an unfamiliar other in these two populations of children. To this end, we 
measured personal space using a modified version of the stop-distance procedure (Hayduk, 1981a; 
Hayduk, 1981b; Hayduk, 1983). This paradigm represents one of the most frequently used measure 
of personal space regulation, allowing reliable estimates of preferred interpersonal distance under 
varied conditions and repeated measures (for reviews, see Aiello, 1987 and Hayduk, 1983). In our 
experiment, personal space was measured as the distance at which children felt most comfortable as 
an unfamiliar adult confederate approached them or they approached the confederate. Each 
participant was tested twice, i.e., before and after a break during which participant interacted with 
the confederate. 
Prior research has suggested that an excessively functioning amygdala may account for 
abnormal fears and enhanced anxiety in autistic children, leading to impaired social interactions and 
avoidant behaviors in these patients (Hirstein et al 2001; Amaral et al. 2003; Schulkin, 2006; 
Corbett et al. 2006; Markram et al. 2008; Swartz et al. 2011). Accordingly, we hypothesized that 
ASD children, due to increased fear and hyperarousal following personal space violations, would 
fail to reliably and flexibly regulate personal space, thereby maintaining a farther and rigid distance 
from others. As a consequence, we predicted that interpersonal distance would be larger in ASDs 
than in TD children and it should be modulated by a brief social interaction in TD but not in ASDs 
children. 
 
9.2 Methods 
 
Ethics statement 
The study involved children with autism spectrum disorders and children with typical 
development in a behavioral experiment. Subjects’ parents gave written informed consent to their 
children’s participation in the study, which was approved by the ethics committee of the Centro 
Autismo, Ausl Reggio Emilia, where the experiment was performed, and by the ethics committee of 
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the Department of Psychology of the University of Bologna. The experiment was conducted 
according to the ethical guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Participants 
Fifteen male children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) participated in the study. The 
autistic children were recruited through referrals from a center for children with ASD (Reggio 
Emilia, Italy). They will hereby be designated as the group of individuals with ASD. All had 
received a formal diagnosis of an ASD by an independent clinician, according to the standard 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) and all were high functioning. The diagnosis was confirmed using the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS-G) scale (Lord et al. 2000), given by a trained 
clinical psychologist. ASD children had all fluent language abilities. They had no other diagnosed 
neurological (e.g. cerebral palsy or epilepsy) or medical disorders, and none of them were taking 
antipsychotic drugs at the time of testing. 
We compared the ASD children to 23 male children with typical development (henceforth TD 
children). TD children were recruited in local schools and were free of current or past psychiatric or 
neurological illness as determined by history.  
ASD and TD groups did not differ with respect to both mental
4
 (TD = 9.17 years, sd = 1.03 
years; ASD= 9.07 years, sd =2.43 years; [F(1,36) = 0.05; p = .85], and chronological age (TD = 
9.56 years, sd = 1.73 years; ASD = 9.73 years, sd =2.37 years; [F(1,36) = .06; p = .80]; see Table 
2).  
 
 
 
                                                             
4 The mental age was calculated by using the formula (chronological age X IQ/100). The Total IQ 
scores were measured with the WISC-III, submitted to children in a session different from the 
experimental session. 
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Table 2. Subject Demographics for Children Participating in the Study 
 
ASD Group (N=15) 
(Mean/SD) 
 
TD Group (N=23) 
(Mean/SD) 
 
Chronological Age 
 
9.73 (+/- 2.37) 9.56 (+/- 1.73) 
Mental Age 
 
9.07 (+/- 2.43) 9.17 (+/- 1.03) 
Full Scale IQ 
 
92.73 (+/- 16.08) 97.61 (+/- 10.76) 
ADOS (Full Scale) 
 
15.6 (+/- 3.37) NA 
ADOS (Social interaction) 8 (+/- 2.24) NA 
ADOS (Communication) 
 
5.8 (+/- 3.12) NA 
ADOS (Imagination) 
 
1.2 (+/- 0.77) NA 
ADOS ( Behaviors) 1.67 (+/- 1.72) NA 
Diagnosis 9 (F84.9) 6 (F84.0) NA 
IQ assessed with Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–Third Edition (WISC-III) or Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
 
Procedure 
We applied an adapted version of the stop-distance paradigm used by Kennedy et al. [14]. All 
participants were tested in the same room (7 x 4 m) by one experimenter and one confederate. The 
role of the experimenter and confederate was taken in turns. Care was taken to ensure that the 
experimental setup remained identical across participants.  
Testing began with a participant positioned at a fixed location in the room and the confederate 
standing, facing the participant from a far starting position (five meters), or from a close starting 
position (30 cm). In half of the trials, the female confederate was always the one moving, at a 
natural gait either toward (i.e., far starting position) or away (i.e., close starting position) from the 
participant. In the other half of the trials, the participant was always the one moving, either 
approaching or withdrawing from the confederate (see Fig. 18). Participants were instructed to tell 
the confederate to stop at their preferred distance (i.e., the distance between themselves and the 
confederate at which they felt most comfortable), in the trials when the confederate was moving, 
and chose their ideal interpersonal distance in the trials when they were moving. During the 
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approach/withdrawal movement, the confederate made no eye contact, maintained a neutral facial 
expression, and never touched the participant. The interpersonal distance was measured with a 
digital laser measurer (Agatec, model DM100, error ± .003m), as the distance between the 
confederate’ toes and the participant’s toes.  
 
Figure 18: Experimental procedure. In the first condition (A) the participant approached the confederate starting 
from a far distance (5 m). In the second condition (B) the confederate approached the participant starting from a far 
distance (5 m). In the third condition (C) the participant moved away from the confederate starting from a close distance 
(face to face). In the fourth condition (D) the confederate moved away from the participant starting from a close 
distance (face to face). 
 
The same procedure was repeated twice, before and after a 10-minute time interval.  During 
the time interval, the confederate invited the subject to seat down on a cushion placed in the same 
room and to read together an illustrated book chosen by the participant. The children could choose 
one illustrated book among fifteen different ones, which had been suggested by the their teachers or 
psychologists as being particularly interesting for each child. During the interaction, the confederate 
read the book and asked three questions concerning the content of the book, while each participant 
was invited to make comments and ask questions to the confederate. In order to measure the amount 
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of this social interaction, the experimenter assigned a score between 0 and 3 to each of three 
behaviors: i) the child’s ability to answer to the confederate’s questions, ii) the child’s ability to 
make comments about the book, and iii) the child’s ability to ask questions to the confederate. 
These three ratings were averaged together to obtain an index of social interaction.    
Before starting the experiment all participants received an explanation of the task and had 
four practice trials with the experimenter. Then the confederate was introduced.  
To sum up, we run a 2x2x2 design with starting position (close and far), person moving 
(confederate and participant) and session (before and after social interaction) as factors. Each cell of 
the experimental design comprised 3 trials, thus yielding a total of 24 completely randomized trials. 
 
9.3 Results 
The effect of social interaction on personal space regulation was verified in children with TD 
and in children with ASD by comparing the interpersonal distance in the two groups before and 
after the interaction with the adult confederate. To this aim, a mixed-design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on the measure of interpersonal distance expressed in mm, with group 
(ASD and TD) as a between-subject variable, and session (before and after social interaction) as a 
within-subject variable. For the purpose of this analysis, data were collapsed across person moving 
(confederate and participant), and starting position (close and far) condition. 
The variable group was significant [F(1,36) = 14.84; p < .0001; ηp
2
= .292], revealing that the 
interpersonal distance was larger in ASD children than in TD children (2850 mm vs.1595 mm, 
respectively; see Fig. 19). There was also a marginally significant effect of session [F(1,36) = 3.80;  
p = .06; ηp
2
 = .096], showing that interpersonal distance was larger before (2175 mm) than after 
(2022 mm) the social interaction. 
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Figure 19: Mean preferred distance from the confederate in children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), and 
children with typical development (TD). Asterisk indicates significant comparison (p < 0.05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
Critically, the main effects were qualified by a significant group X session interaction 
[F(1,36) = 7.73; p < .01; ηp
2
 = .177]. Indeed, post-hoc analysis showed that the social interaction 
between participant and confederate during the interval did not modulate personal space in ASD 
children (before = 2826 mm, after = 2874 mm, p = .95), whereas it modulated personal space in TD 
children, reducing the distance after (1461 mm), as compared to before (1730 mm), the social 
interaction (p < .003; see Fig. 20). Moreover, interpersonal distance was larger in ASD children 
than TD children both before and after social interaction (p < .0002 for both comparisons). 
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Figure 20: Mean preferred distance from the confederate before and after a brief social interaction in children 
with typical development (TD) and children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Asterisk indicates significant 
comparison (p < 0.05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
For completeness, we also run an additional ANOVA that included all the variables, and 
specifically group (ASD and TD) as a between-subject variable, and person moving (confederate 
and participant), starting position (close and far), and session (before and after social-interaction) as 
within-subject variables. As before, this second ANOVA demonstrated that the variable group 
[F(1,36) = 14.84; p < .0001; ηp
2
 = .292], session [F(1,36) = 3.80; p = .06; ηp
2
 = .096], and the group 
X session interaction [F(1,36) = 7.73; p < .01; ηp
2
 = .177] were significant. We also found that the 
interaction between group, person moving, and starting-position was significant [F(1,36) = 8.24; p < 
.006; ηp
2
 = .186]. Post-hoc analysis of this three-way interaction showed that, in ASD children, the 
interpersonal distance was significantly larger when the participant moved away from (3376 mm) 
rather than toward (2413 mm) the confederate (p < .0001). By contrast, this difference was not 
significant when the confederate moved away or approached the ASD participant (when starting 
close  = 2630 mm; when starting far = 2979 mm, p = .26).  
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In TD children, this difference was not significant neither when the participant moved away 
or approached the confederate (when starting close = 1781 mm; when starting far = 1417 mm), nor 
when the confederate moved away or approached the participant (close starting position  = 1.493 
mm;  far starting position = 1.688 mm; all p > .05). Note, however, that the interpersonal distance 
remained larger in ASD children than in TD children, regardless of person moving (confederate or 
participant), or starting position (close or far) (p < .001 in all comparison). 
The lack of modulation of interpersonal distance may depend on poor or reduced social 
interaction with the confederate in ASD compared to TD children, and not on a deficit of personal 
space regulation. To explore this possibility, an index of social interaction, ranging form 0 to 3, was 
computed for each participant by averaging together the scores assigned by the experimenter to 
three behaviors observed during the child-confederate interaction (see Method). Although the social 
interaction index of the ASD group was somewhat lower than control group (2 and 2.3, in ASD and 
TD children, respectively), the analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of group, [F(1,36) = 
0.71; p < .4]. Nevertheless, to ensure that our findings were not driven by subtle group differences 
in the amount of social interaction with confederate, the main ANOVA was repeated with the social 
interaction index as covariate. The previously significant group X session interaction remained 
significant, [F(1,35) = 6.8; p < .01; ηp
2
 = .16]. As a further control analysis, we ranked ASD 
participants based on the index of social interaction and divided participants into good-interaction 
(ASDgi, n = 7) and poor-interaction (ASDpi, n = 8) groups thorough a median split. Finally, an 
ANOVA was performed on the measure of the personal space difference (interpersonal distance 
after interaction – before interaction), with group (ASDpi, ASDgi) as between-subject variable. The 
variable group was not significant [F(1,13) = 1.01; p = 0.33].  Overall, these data suggest that the 
lack of modulation of interpersonal distance were not due to reduced social interaction with the 
confederate during the interval in ASD compared to TD children. 
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Control experiment 
Our data suggest that social interaction influences personal space in TD and not in ASD 
children. However, to ensure that this effect in TD children was not simply due to the time interval 
between the first and the second measure, or to a familiarization with the task or with the 
confederate, rather than to the effect of social interaction between the confederate and the subject, 
an additional control group of 23 age-matched TD children (TD-C) was tested.   
The TD-C group was submitted to the same procedure previously described with the only 
difference that during the time interval participant and confederate did not read a book together, but 
the subject read a book by himself, while the confederate was busy doing something else in the 
same room. If the reduction of the personal distance observed in TD children was due to time 
interval per se, then it should be found both in the TD and in the TD-C group. By contrast, if the 
reduction of the interpersonal distance in TD was due to the interaction between confederate and 
subject during the time interval, then it should be found only in TD but not in TD-C group. TD-C 
children and TD were compared by an ANOVA with group (with and without social interaction) as 
a between-subject variable, and with session (before and after time-interval), as a within-subject 
variable. 
The variable session was significant [F(1,44) = 11.49; p < .001; ηp
2
 = .21], showing that 
interpersonal distance was smaller after (1592 mm) than before (1733 mm) the time interval. In line 
with the hypothesis, the group X session interaction was significant [F(1,44) = 9.48; p < .001; ηp
2
 = 
.18]. Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey for equal N) showed a reduction of personal space in the group 
with social interaction (TD group, before = 1730 mm, after =1460 mm, p < .0002), but not in the 
group without social interaction (TD-C group, before = 1735 mm, after = 1722 mm, p = .97). 
Moreover, the personal space was significantly different between the two groups after (p < .0001) 
but not before (p = .92) time interval (Fig. 21). 
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Figure 21: Mean preferred distance from the confederate in two groups of children with typical development 
before and after a time interval, during which the confederate interacted (TD group), or not (TD-C group), with the 
participant. Asterisk indicates significant comparison (p < 0.05). Error bars denote s.e.m. 
 
9.4 Discussion 
In this study, we investigated personal space regulation in children with typical development 
(TD) and in children with high-functioning autism, before and after a brief interaction with an 
unfamiliar adult confederate. While previous anecdotal observations have suggested that ASD 
children have some difficulties in appropriately regulating one’s distance from other people during 
social interactions, the empirical evidence supporting this claim has been conspicuously lacking. 
Here, a stop-distance procedure, previously described in Chapter 5, was used to measure the 
interpersonal space in ASD and TD children. We provide new evidence that interpersonal space 
regulation is impaired in high-functioning ASD children. Specifically, we found that ASD children 
are less tolerant of close proximity to an unfamiliar adult and prefer farther interpersonal distance 
compared to TD children. Moreover, results showed that interpersonal distance is larger in autistic 
children when they move away from, rather than toward, the confederate, suggesting that these 
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children feel more uncomfortable and react (i.e., step away) more strongly following personal space 
violations (i.e. close starting position) than TD children.  
A critical finding of the present study concerns the modulation of a brief social interaction on 
personal space regulation. As described in Chapter 5, previous studies focused on the effects on 
personal space of long-lasting interaction, such as infant-caregiver attachment (Cassidy et al. 1994; 
Bar-Haim et al. 2002) and familiarity between interacting partners (Watson, 1970; Cristani et al. 
2011). Here, we report that a transitory social interaction with an unknown adult results in a rapid, 
on-line adjustment of the interpersonal distance in TD children, indicating that personal space 
regulation exhibits dynamic properties and higher flexibility that may facilitate social interactions 
and communication in normal individuals. Such interpersonal distance changes were not simply due 
to the effects of time interval between the first and the second interpersonal distance measurement, 
or to participants’ familiarization with the stop-distance procedure or the adult confederate, as 
demonstrated by the results of a control experiment. Indeed, when during the interval between first 
and second stop-distance procedure normally developing children read a book alone without 
interacting with the confederate, no change in the size of personal space was observed. Critically, 
ASD individuals failed to display changes of social distance in response to a brief social interaction, 
suggesting a marked inflexibility of personal space in this condition. 
In the past few years, a distinction has arisen between flexibility and permeability of personal 
space. Permeability refers to the ease with which personal space is penetrated or intruded upon, 
irrespective of its current size or shape, while flexibility refers to situationally induced changes in 
the size and shape of personal space (Sommer, 1969; Little, 1965). Our data suggest that, in autistic 
children, personal space is altered both in permeability, since it is larger in ASD then in TD 
children, and in flexibility, since it is not reduced by a social interaction with the confederate. We 
propose that the impairment in flexibility and permeability of personal space in ASD children 
reflects overarousal and enhanced fear induced by others intruding their social space. 
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A previous lesion and neuroimaging study in humans suggested that the amygdala plays a key 
role in underpinning personal space regulation (Kennedy et al. 2009), either by triggering innate 
emotional reactions in response to personal space violations, or learning the association between 
close distance and aversive outcomes. Linking these previous results to the present findings, we 
suggest that reduced tolerance of physical closeness with a stranger and lack of flexibility of 
personal space in ASD children may result from impairment of an amygdala-based mechanism. 
This hypothesis is supported by several data. Recent studies indicate that the amygdala is enlarged 
in children with autism (Schumann et al. 2009) and could contribute to the abnormalities of fear and 
anxiety that appear to be a common feature of autism. An excessively functioning amygdala may 
account for the increased autonomic responses in autistic children (e.g., Hirstein et al. 2001; Amaral  
et al. 2003; Schulkin, 2006, Corbett et al. 2006, but see also Bernier et al. 2005; Ben Shalom et al. 
2006; Bölte et al. 2008 for different results) leading to withdrawal from social interactions (Corbett 
et al. 2006). Moreover, functional imaging in older children and adults with autism provide 
evidence of an abnormal pattern of amygdala activation in response to social stimuli (Swartz et al 
2011; Dalton et al. 2005; Kleinhans et al. 2009; Weng et al. 2011). This is further confirmed by 
findings in an animal model of autism, in which rats exposed to valproic acid exhibit autism-like 
symptoms associated with enhanced anxiety and fear processing in the amygdale (Markram et al. 
2008). Finally, recent evidence indicates that oxytocin, a neuropeptide known to reduce activity in 
the amygdala, thereby resulting in decreased fear responses (Kirsch et al. 2005), can modulate 
social distance in interacting partners (Scheele et al. 2012), and improve social interactions in ASD 
individuals (Andari et al. 2010). 
Several prior observations are in keeping with the present findings. Employing the naturalistic 
observation method, Rogers and Fine (Rogers, 1977) compared the personal distance behaviors of 
an autistic and asymbiotic psychotic child during play therapy. The autistic child maintained a 
greater personal distance from the therapist compared to the symbiotic child. Moreover, Parson and 
colleagues (Parsons et al. 2004) compared the ability to understand and use some virtual 
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environments, such as a Virtual Cafè, in a social congruent way, in ASD participants of 13-18 years 
of age and in age-matched control participants. The results showed that the majority of autistic 
subjects seemed to have a basic understanding of the virtual environment as a representation of 
reality, but when participant’s ability relative to some social norms was judged by naïve rates, 
autistics were more likely to be judged as bumping into, or walking between, other people in the 
virtual scene, compared to their paired matches. The authors suggested that understanding personal 
space is impaired in autism. More recently, Kennedy and colleagues (Kennedy et al. 2010), 
analyzing parent- and teacher-report questionnaire ratings, concluded that ASDs children are less 
aware of social distance than their unaffected siblings, showing significantly higher levels of 
interpersonal distance violations than controls.  Overall, these previous findings are consistent with 
the present results, supporting the general conclusion that interpersonal distance regulation is 
impaired in autism. Still, results of increased violations of personal space in autistic individuals 
reported both by Parsons et al. (2004) and Kennedy et al. (2010) studies are not in accordance with 
behavioral patterns observed in the present study, in which ASD children exhibit large interpersonal 
distance preference. However, several methodological differences between previous studies and the 
present one may account for the seemingly discrepant results. For instance, Parson and colleagues 
(2004) study differed from ours in that they used virtual figures and scenes to probe personal space. 
It is possible that participants in the ASD group bumped into the people in the virtual environment 
because they have difficulty understanding the virtual environment as representations of reality. 
Likewise, Kennedy and colleagues (2010) analyzed questionnaire-based data and did not provide a 
direct and controlled assessment of personal space in ASD children. Thus, interpersonal distance 
measures and paradigms remain to be systematically compared in autism. 
Two potential limitations of this study deserve mention. First, our suggestion that increased 
fear and hyperarousal following personal space violations would result in larger interpersonal 
boundaries in ASD compared to TD children remains speculative.  Physiological reactions, such as 
skin conductance responses and heart rate, and subjective ratings of experience may provide 
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potential measures of affect. While the present behavioural data support the claim that personal 
space regulation is impaired in autism, they cannot directly ascertain the role of affective processes 
in driving the difficulty with social space in ASD children. Second, as interpersonal distance in the 
present study was assessed in a controlled experimental setting, we should be cautious about 
generalizing the findings to other, more ecological settings. Discrepancy between the current and 
previous findings (Kennedy et al. 2010; Parson et al. 2004) may reflect differences across various 
settings.  
To conclude, discomfort and fear of physical closeness with a social partner may be one of the 
most salient factors in regulating interpersonal distance during social interaction (Argyle et al. 
1965). Here, we report that ASD children maintain a farther and rigid distance from unfamiliar 
others than do TD individuals, suggesting that they are less tolerant and more reactive to violations 
of personal space. We suggest that these effects could arise in part through enhanced, rather than 
reduced, amygdala functioning in childhood autism spectrum disorders. A better characterization of 
the mechanisms involved in abnormal personal space regulation in ASD children may lead to an 
improved understanding of how ASD develops and how to intervene to improve social functioning. 
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CHAPTER 10. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The main aim of the present dissertation was to study ecological and interpersonal aspects of 
self-awareness. Regarding the ecological self, I investigated the mechanism through which we 
distinguish between self and other people’s body image. As far as the interpersonal self is 
concerned, I investigated the mechanism through which we regulate the permeability and flexibility 
of our own personal space. 
In Chapter 6 7 and 8 the development and the degeneration of self body recognition during 
the life span was addressed. In Chapters 6 and 7 a matching-to sample task and a variation of the 
same where used to answer the question if the implicit recognition of own body image is different 
or similar in healthy and autistic children.  
Specifically in Chapter 6 I have investigate whether the implicit self body-parts and self-face-
parts recognition is present in autistic as well as in healthy children. Results  show that autistic and 
healthy children’s performance in the visual matching task was better with self than with others’ 
body and face-parts, suggesting that they are able to implicitly distinguish self and others’ stimuli 
and to take an advantage in processing self-compared to others’ stimuli. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 7, I used a variation of the visual-matching task , wit the aim of 
assessing whether the influence of emotional body postures on implicit bodily self-processing is 
similar or different in autistic and healthy children. Results showed that, both in healthy and autistic 
children, the self-advantage is modulated by emotional body postures when they are endogenously 
generated. For example, we better implicitly recognize our own bodily postures when we 
endogenously express happiness and neutral state than when we express fearful state. The different 
emotions have different roles for our survival and it is possible that for this reason they differently 
modulate the implicit self-other recognition.  
Furthermore, the result of the experiments described in Chapter 6 and 7 support the theory 
that there are different ‘‘levels’’ of self and that not all of these levels are impaired in autism, being 
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the bodily-self spared in (high functioning) autistic children. Thus, bodily self/other recognition and 
its modulations by emotional body postures are part of the low-level aspect of the self-awareness 
that seems preserved in subjects with autism spectrum disorders. 
Considering that the implicit bodily self/other recognition and its modulations by emotional 
body postures are preserved in subjects with autism spectrum disorders, is possible that this kind of 
bodily recognition is  a low-level aspect of the self-awareness with a crucial role for the survival of 
social species. Other components of the self-concept as for example the mental judgment (Williams, 
2010) or the self referential understanding of emotions (Hobson. et al.  2006; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 
2004) are considered mental or high level components of self-awareness and can be impaired in this 
pathological population. It is possible to hypothesize that the low and high level component of the 
self-awareness share some common cognitive mechanisms and linked cerebral networks. For this 
reason the use of preserved low level component of the self awareness could be adopted to 
rehabilitate the impaired high level component. 
In Chapter 8 we tested the implicit and explicit self body and face parts recognition in patients 
with Parkinson’s disease. I asked if the motor and proprioceptive deficits of these patients affect the 
sensorimotor representation of one’s own body. As expected, in the implicit task patients with 
Parkinson’s disease were less accurate with self than with others’ face and body parts showing a 
self-disadvantage effect, whereas this effect wasn’t present in the explicit task. These data 
contribute to the current debate on the mechanisms of the implicit recognition of own body. In line 
with the behavioral and neuroimaging studies (Frassinetti etal., 2011; Ferri et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 
2012) the results of the present experiments are a further proof that the implicit body self-advantage 
relies upon the integration of visual information with other modalities, having the sensorimotor 
body representation the crucial role. 
A possible interpretation of the advantage in processing self compared to others’ bodily image in 
our implicit task is that this effect is due to an increased familiarity with self stimuli (relative to 
unfamiliar others). This interpretation can be excluded for at least two reasons. The first one is that 
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healthy children did not show any facilitation in discriminating their mother’s body/face parts 
versus another woman’s stimuli (Frassinetti at al, 2012). Second, if the self-advantage is due to a 
mere visual–perceptual facilitation, it should be independent of the implicit or explicit request. 
Since, in the study described in Chapter 8, as well as in previous studies (Frassinetti et al. 2011; 
Ferri et al. 2012) the self-advantage was not found when an explicit recognition of one’s own body 
was required, I have excluded that the body self-advantage relies upon a mere visual representation 
of one’s own body. With the experiment described in Chapter 8 we have obtained a further proof of 
the hypothesis that the body self advantage is the expression of an implicit access to own body 
image, based mainly on the sensorimotor representation of one’s own body. ,The sensorimotor 
hypothesis is that when subjects observed stimuli depicting their own body image, the displayed 
stimulus perfectly matches with the observer’s body sensorimotor representation (Ferri et al., 2011) 
and the observer is advantaged in performing the task. 
Taken togetherthe results of the experiments described in Chapter 6 ,7 and 8 showed that in autistic 
children but not in patients with Parkinson’s disease the implicit access to own body image and its 
underling sensorimotor representation are spared. 
In the last part of my dissertation, ,I took in consideration another aspect of the self-concept, that is 
the interpersonal regulation of our spatial behavior.  In Chapter 9 a stop-distance paradigm was used 
in healthy and autistic children to derive measures of their personal space before and after an 
interaction with an unknown person. The results showed that before the interaction autistic children 
are less tolerant of close proximity to an unfamiliar adult and prefer farther interpersonal distance 
compared to healthy children. Moreover autistic children failed to display changes of social distance 
in response to a brief social interaction. Thus, these results showed that the autistic personal space is 
less permeable and less flexible than that of  healthy children.  
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These findings, contribute to the current debate about the autistic social deficit and their underlying 
cerebral networks, getting further light about an interpersonal aspect of the self, less studied in this 
pathological population. 
The impairment of the personal space in autistic children is probably cause by increased fear and 
hyperarousal following personal space violations and by the underling  dysfunctions of the cerebral 
system.   
 
In conclusion the dissertation offers a journey from the development to the degeneration of the 
mechanisms mediating the recognition of own body image and the regulation of own personal 
space, passing through the investigation of implicit and explicit access to different aspect of the 
self-concept. The exposed results in the present dissertation contribute to advance the basic 
knowledge and provide new instruments to take advantage of the residual abilities to rehabilitate the 
deficits.  
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